一、案件介绍
(一)争议主题：银行和金融服务
(二)适用规则：ICSID公约-仲裁规则
(三)申请人：中国平安保险(集团)有限公司(中文)、中国平安人寿保险股份有限公司(中文)
(四)被申请人：比利时
(五)案件背景
富通集团曾在布鲁塞尔泛欧交易所、阿姆斯特丹泛欧交易所和卢森堡证券交易所上市，并活跃于零售银行、资产管理、商业银行和保险业务。2007年，当申请人首次投资富通集团时，富通集团是全球收入第20大企业，也是全球第三大商业和储蓄银行，拥有6.5万名员工。2007年10月至2008年7月，申请人在公开市场上以超过20亿美元的总额收购了富通的股份，并成为富通最大的单一股东。自2008年7月起，申请人所持有的富通股份约占富通已发行股份的4.81%。申请人还于2007年11月与富通达成了一项协议，他们有权任命富通董事会的董事。2008年9月15日，雷曼兄弟倒闭，银行贷款市场枯竭。2008年9月16日，有传言称富通集团可能会推出一款新的手机以筹集额外资金。这些谣言引发了对富通偿付能力的担忧，从而阻碍了其他银行向富通银行放贷，并对富通银行的融资流动性状况构成了重大风险。富通不得不求助比利时国家银行，比利时采取了一系列措施(这些措施被称之为两次干预)。申请人认为，“两次干预”所涉及的交易导致申请人在富通银行的投资被完全没收。后富通集团一直纯粹从事保险业务。2012年，该公司的总收入约为157亿美元，比申请人2007年首次投资时少了近90%。
二、程序详细信息
三、仲裁裁决原文
IntroductionandParties
ThiscaseconcernsadisputesubmittedtotheInternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputes(“ICSID”orthe“Centre”)onthebasisof:theAgreementbetweentheGovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandtheBelgium-Luxembourg EconomicUnionontheEncouragementandReciprocalProtectionofInvestmentsdated June4,1984,whichenteredintoforceonOctober5,1986(the“1986BIT”);theAgreementbetweenthe GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandtheBelgium- LuxembourgEconomicUnionontheReciprocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestmentsdatedJune6,2005,whichenteredintoforceonDecember1,2009(the“2009BIT”);andtheConventionontheSettlementofInvestmentDisputesbetween StatesandNationalsofOtherStates(the“ICSIDConvention”).
TheClaimantsarePingAnLifeInsuranceCompanyofChina,LimitedandPingAnInsurance(Group)ofChina,Limited(the“Claimants”).TheClaimantsarecompaniesincorporatedunderthelawsofthePeople’sRepublicofChinawiththeirregistered officesinShenzhen,GuangDongProvince.
TheClaimantsarerepresentedbyMessrs.ChrisColbridge,PhillipKurekandChiraagShahofthelawfirmKirkland&EllisInternationalLLP,London,Mr.JohnHartmanof Kirkland&EllisInternationalLLP,Chicago,ProfessorJamesCrawfordACSC,TheHague,andMr.PaulKeyQCofEssexCourtChambers,London.
TheRespondentistheKingdomofBelgium(the“Respondent”or“Belgium”).
BelgiumisrepresentedbyMessrs.ThierryTilquin,NicolasAngelet,ArnaudNuytsandMmes.MathildeRousseau,ValérieMeeus andThérèseLoffetofthelawfirmLiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrick,Brussels,andMessrs.RonaldE.M.GoodmanandPierred’ArgentofthelawfirmFoley HoagLLP,Washington,D.C.
TheClaimantsandBelgiumarehereinaftercollectivelyreferredtoasthe“Parties.”
ProceduralHistory
OnSeptember7,2012,theClaimantsfiledarequestforarbitrationagainstBelgiumdatedAugust27,2012(the“Request”)withICSID.InaccordancewithRule5oftheICSID RulesofProcedurefortheInstitutionofConciliationandArbitrationProceedings(the“InstitutionRules”),ICSIDacknowledgedreceiptoftheRequestonSeptember7,2012 andtransmittedacopytoBelgiumonSeptember10,2012.
FollowingquestionsposedbytheICSIDSecretariat,theClaimantssupplementedtheRequestbyaletterdatedSeptember13,2012.
OnSeptember19,2012,theSecretary-GeneralofICSIDregisteredtheRequestinaccordancewithArticle36(3)oftheICSIDConventionandnotifiedthePartiesoftheregistration.IntheNoticeofRegistration,theSecretary-GeneralinvitedthePartiestoproceedtoconstituteanarbitraltribunalassoonaspossibleinaccordancewithRule7(d)oftheInstitutionRules.
OnOctober12,2012,pursuanttoRule2(1)(a)oftheICSIDRulesofProcedureforArbitrationProceedings(the“ArbitrationRules”),theClaimantsmadeaproposalastothenumberofarbitratorsandthemethodoftheirappointment,andinvitedBelgiumtoacceptthisproposal.
OnNovember19,2012,theClaimantsadvisedBelgiumthattheyhadnotyetreceivedBelgium’sacceptanceoftheirproposalonthemethodofappointmentoftheTribunalandindicatedthattheywouldalsobewillingtodiscussotherpossiblemethodsofappointment.
OnNovember26,2012, BelgiumnotifiedtheCentrethatithadengaged Messrs.ThierryTilquin,NicolasAngelet,andArnaudNuytsofthelawfirmLiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrickinBrusselsandMessrs.RonaldE.M.GoodmanandPierred’ArgentofthelawfirmFoley HoagLLPinWashington,D.C.ascounselinthiscase.
OnDecember10,2012, theClaimantsinformedtheCentrethat the PartieshadagreedtoconstitutetheTribunalinaccordancewithArticle37(2)(a)oftheICSIDConventionasfollows:theTribunalwouldconsistofthreearbitrators,onetobeappointedbyeachpartyandthethird,presidingarbitratortobeappointedbyagreementoftheParties.Onthesameday,BelgiumconfirmedtheParties’agreement.
OnDecember12,2012,theClaimantsappointedMr.DavidA.R.WilliamsQC,anationalofNewZealand,asarbitratorpursuanttotheParties’agreement.OnDecember 18,2012,ICSIDinformedthePartiesthatMr.WilliamshadacceptedhisappointmentandprovidedthePartieswithMr.Williams’declaration.
OnDecember21,2012,BelgiumappointedProfessorPhilippeSandsQC,anationaloftheUnitedKingdomandFrance,asarbitrator.OnJanuary2,2013,ICSIDinformedthePartiesthatProfessorSandshadacceptedhisappointment.AttachedtotheacceptancewasProfessorSands’declaration,statementandcurriculumvitae.
OnJanuary17,2013,theClaimantsrequestedclarificationfromProfessorSandsinrelationtohisstatementandcurriculumvitae.Inparticular,theysoughtinformationonProfessorSands’linkswiththelawfirmofFoley HoagLLP.ProfessorSandssubmittedhisresponsetotheClaimants’requestonJanuary28,2013.ProfessorSandsalsopreparedasupplementarystatementtohisdeclaration,whichICSIDtransmittedtothePartiesonJanuary30,2013.OnFebruary6,2013,theClaimantsrequestedProfessorSandstoprovidefurtherclarificationtohisresponseofJanuary28,2013.ProfessorSandsrespondedbyletterofFebruary15,2013.
OnFebruary5,2013,theClaimantsnotifiedtheCentrethatthePartieshadagreedthattheappointmentofthepresidingarbitratorwouldbemadebytheco-arbitrators,inconsultationwiththeParties.ByletterofFebruary6,2013,theCentreinformedthePartiesthattheco-arbitratorshadacceptedthetermsoftheParties’revisedagreementonthemethodofappointingthepresidingarbitrator.
OnFebruary13,2013,theCentreinformedthePartiesthattheco-arbitratorshadagreedtoappointLord(Lawrence)CollinsofMapesbury,LL.D.,F.B.A.,anationaloftheUnitedKingdom,asthePresidentoftheTribunal.ThePartieswereinvitedtoindicateif theyhadanyjointobjectionstotheappointment.
OnFebruary22,2013,thePartiesinformed theCentre thattheyhad noobjectionstotheappointmentofLordCollinsasPresidentoftheTribunal.
InaccordancewithRule6(1)oftheICSIDArbitrationRules,onFebruary26,2013,theSecretary-GeneralnotifiedthePartiesthatallthreearbitratorshadacceptedtheirappointmentsandthattheTribunalwasthereforedeemedtohavebeenconstitutedonthatdate.Ms.MartinaPolasek,ICSID,TeamLeader/LegalCounsel,wasdesignatedtoserveasSecretaryoftheTribunal. InaccordancewithICSIDArbitrationRule13(1),theTribunalheldafirstsessionwiththePartiesonApril13,2013inLondon,England.
Followingthefirstsession,onApril29,2013,thePresidentoftheTribunalissuedProceduralOrderNo.1.ItwasagreedinteraliathattheapplicableArbitrationRuleswouldbethoseineffectfromApril10,2006,thattheprocedurallanguageswouldbeEnglishandFrenchandthattheplaceofproceedingwouldbeTheHague.ProceduralOrderNo.1alsosetoutatimetableforthefilingoftheParties’writtensubmissions,whichincludedtwoalternatescenarios:ScenarioAtoapplyifBelgiumweretoraiseobjectionstojurisdictionandScenarioBtoapplyifnosuchobjectionsweretoberaised.
InaccordancewithProceduralOrderNo.1,theClaimantsfiledtheirmemorialonthemerits,togetherwithexpertreportsofProfessorAlanD.MorrisonandDr.PabloT.Spiller,onNovember11,2013.
OnDecember20,2013,Belgiumfileditsnoticeofintenttofileobjectionstojurisdiction.AscontemplatedinProceduralOrderNo.1, theproceedingonthemeritswassuspendedunderRule41(3)oftheArbitrationRules, andScenarioAoftheproceduralcalendarwasadopted.
OnFebruary10,2014,Belgiumfileditsmemorialonjurisdiction.
OnMarch19,2014,theClaimantsinformedtheCentrethattheyhadengagedProfessorJamesCrawfordACSCofMatrixChambersinLondonasadditionalco-counsel.TheClaimantsnotedthatProfessorCrawfordandProfessorSandspractisedatthesamebarristers’chamber,namely MatrixChambers.
On March24,2014, ProfessorSandsdisclosedtothePartiesthathewascurrentlyactingasco-counselwithProfessorCrawfordinseveralcases.ThePartiesdidnotraiseanyobjectionsonProfessorSands’disclosure.
OnMay12,2014,theClaimantsfiledtheircounter-memorial onjurisdiction, and onJuly11,2014,Belgiumfileditsreplyonjurisdiction.
OnSeptember9,2014,theClaimantsfiledtheirrejoinderonjurisdiction,togetherwiththewitnessstatementofMr.MartinTornberg(the“TornbergStatement”). OnSeptember22,2014,ProfessorSandssubmittedanadditionaldisclosureconcerningProfessorCrawford.
ByletterofSeptember29,2014,Belgiumcontestedtheadmissibilityof theTornbergStatement,arguingthatitshouldhavebeenfiledwiththeClaimants’counter-memorialonjurisdiction.Thesameday,theTribunalinvitedtheClaimants’commentsonBelgium’sletter,whichtheClaimantsthensubmittedonOctober2,2014.
OnOctober7,2014,theTribunalissuedProceduralOrderNo.2dismissingBelgium’sobjectionstotheadmissibilityoftheTornbergStatement.Bythesameorder,theTribunalinvitedBelgiumtofileawrittenresponsetotheTornbergStatement,andBelgiumfiledsuchresponseonOctober31,2014.
AhearingonjurisdictiontookplaceinLondonfromNovember10to11,2014.InadditiontotheMembersoftheTribunalandtheActingSecretaryoftheTribunal,Ms.LindsayGastrell,presentatthehearing were:
LiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrickLiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrickLiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrickFoleyHoagLLP
LiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrickLiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrickLiedekerkeWoltersWaelbroeckKirkpatrick Ms.AngelynnMeya
Mr.YuriParkhomenkoDr.ConstantinosSalonidisMr.PedroRamirez
Followingthehearing,thePartiesagreedonamendmentstothetranscriptandfiledanagreedchronologyofeventsonNovember25,2014.
ThePartiesfiledtheirsubmissionsoncostsonFebruary 3,2015(Belgium)andFebruary20,2015(Claimants).
Asindicatedabove,therearetworelevantBilateralInvestmentTreatiesinthepresentcase:the1986BIT,whichenteredintoforceonOctober5,1986,andthe2009BIT,whichenteredintoforceonDecember1,2009.
Forreasonsto bedevelopedbelow,theClaimantsrelyonthe1986BITforthesubstanceoftheirclaimandonthe 2009BITforthejurisdictionofthisTribunal.1Thissectionwillsetoutthemainprovisionsofthe1986BITandthe2009BITrelevanttothejurisdictionalissues.Thesubstantiveprovisionsofthe1986BITonwhichtheClaimantsrelywillbesetoutinthesectionsummarisingtheirclaims.
A.1986BIT
Theequallyauthoritativelanguageversionsofthe1986BITaretheFrench,DutchandChineseversions.
Thepreamblestates(inEnglishtranslation)2thatthegovernmentshaveagreedthetermsofthe1986BIT:
“Wishingtocreatefavourableconditions forthedevelopmentofeconomic cooperationbetweentheContractingStates,and,inparticular,forthe
Satisfiedthattheconclusion,onthebasisofequalityandmutualinterest,ofanagreementonthepromotionandprotectionofinvestmentswillstimulatetheinitiativesofinvestorsandwillthuscontributetotheincreasedeconomicprosperityoftheContractingParties”
Thesubstantiveobligationsofthe1986BITaresetoutprimarilyinArticles2-9,11andespeciallyinArticles3and4,whichcontaintheobligationsofprotectionandequitabletreatment,andthenormalconditionsforexpropriationandnationalisationorothersimilarmeasures.
Theinvestor-StatedisputesettlementprovisionsareArticle10ofthe1986BITandArticle6oftheProtocoltothe1986BIT.Article10ofthe1986BIT provides:
“1. Alldisputesrelatingtoinvestmentsshall benotifiedinwriting,
accompaniedbyasufficientlydetailedmemorandum,bytheinvestorofoneContractingPartytotheotherContractingParty.
Totheextentpossible,disputes willberesolvedamicably, respectingthelawsandregulationsoftheContractingPartyinwhoseterritorytheinvestmentwillhave beenmade.
2.DisputesreferredtointhefirstparagraphofthepresentArticleshall
bewithinthedomesticjurisdictionofthecountrywheretheinvestmentwill havebeenmade.
3.Bywayofexceptiontoparagraph2andindefaultofamicable
resolution,aftersixmonthsfromthedateofthewrittennotificationreferredtointhefirstparagraphofthisArticle,disputesrelatingtotheamountofcompensationpayableincaseofexpropriation,nationalisationoranyothermeasuresimilarlyaffectinginvestments,maybe,attheoptionoftheinvestor:
(a)eitherbesubmittedtothedomesticjurisdictionofthe
ContractingPartyinwhoseterritorytheinvestmentwillhavebeenmade;
(b)orbesubmitteddirectly,totheexclusion ofanyother
recourse,tointernationalarbitration.”
TheProtocol,Article6,providesthatadisputeonanamountofcompensationforexpropriation,etc.mayunderArticle10(1)ofthe1986BITbesubmittedtoanarbitralthreepersontribunal,withtheChairmanoftheArbitrationInstituteoftheStockholmChamberofCommercemakingnecessaryappointmentsinthedefaultofparty-appointedarbitratorsor an agreedchairman.Thetribunalistodetermineits ownprocedurebutmay takeasguidancetheRulesoftheArbitrationInstituteoftheStockholmChamberofCommerceortheICSIDArbitrationRules.
Article14ofthe1986BIT provides:
“1.ThisAgreemententersintoforceonthethirtiethdayfromthedateon
whichtheContractingPartieswillnotifyeachotherofthecompletionoftherequirednationalproceduresintheirrespectivecountries.Itwillremaininforceforaperiodoftenyears.
2.ThisAgreementwillcontinueforanindeterminateperiodoftime,ifnoneoftheContractingPartieshascommunicatedtotheotherParty,inwriting,itsintentiontobringittoanendnolessthanoneyearbeforetheexpiryoftheperiodreferredtointhefirstparagraphofthisArticle.
3.AftertheexpiryoftheinitialperiodofvalidityofthisAgreement, eachoftheContractingPartiesmay,atanytime,decidetobringittoanend,provideditinformstheotherContractingPartyinwritingthroughaminimumoneyear'snotice.
4.Inrespectofinvestmentsmadebeforethedateofexpiryofthis Agreement,theprovisionsofthisAgreementwillremaininforcefor tenyearsfromthedateofexpiry.”
Article8isheaded“Settlementofinvestmentdisputes”and provides:
“1.WhenalegaldisputearisesbetweenaninvestorofoneContracting
PartyandtheotherContractingParty,eitherpartytothedisputeshallnotifytheotherpartytothedisputeinwriting. Asfaraspossible,thepartiestothedisputeshallendeavourtosettlethedisputethroughconsultations,ifnecessarybyseekingexpertadvicefromathirdparty,orbyconciliationbetweentheContractingPartiesthroughdiplomaticchannels.
2.Ifthedisputecannotbesettledthroughconsultationswithinsixmonthsfromthedateithasbeennotifiedbythepartytothedispute,eachContractingPartyconsentstothesubmissionofthedispute,attheinvestor'schoice:[4]
(a)tothecompetentcourtoftheContractingPartythatisa
partytothedispute;
(b) totheInternationalCenterforSettlementofInvestment
Disputes(ICSID)undertheConventionontheSettlementofDisputesbetweenStatesandNationalsofOtherStates,doneatWashingtononMarch18,1965.
Oncetheinvestorhassubmittedthedispute tothecompetentcourtoftheContractingPartyconcernedortotheICSID,thechoiceofoneofthetwo proceduresshallbefinal.…”
Article10isheaded“Transition”andprovides:
“1.ThisAgreementsubstitutesandreplacestheAgreementbetweenthe
GovernmentofthePeople'sRepublicofChinaandtheBelgium-LuxembourgEconomicUnionontheReciprocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestments,signedon4thJune,1984inBrussels.
2.ThepresentAgreementshallapplytoallinvestmentsmadebyinvestorsofeitherContractingPartyintheterritoryoftheotherContractingParty,whethermadebeforeoraftertheentryintoforceofthisAgreement,butshallnotapplytoanydisputeoranyclaimconcerninganinvestmentwhichwas alreadyunderjudicial orarbitralprocessbeforeitsentryintoforce.Suchdisputesandclaimsshall
4TheProtocoltothe2009BITstatesthatitwasmutuallyunderstoodthataBelgian/LuxembourgeoisinvestormustexhaustthedomesticadministrativereviewprocedureunderChineselawbeforesubmissionofadisputetointernationalarbitrationunderArticle8(2). continuetobesettledaccordingtotheprovisionsoftheAgreementof1984mentionedin paragraph1ofthisArticle.”
Article11provides:
“1.ThisAgreementshallenterintoforceonthefirst dayofthe following monthafterthedateonwhichbothContractingPartieshavenotifiedeachotherinwritingthattheirrespectiveinternallegalproceduresnecessarythereforehavebeenfulfilledandremaininforceforaperiodoftenyears. 2.ThisAgreementshallcontinuetobeinforceunlesseitherContractingPartyhasgivenawrittennoticetotheotherContractingPartytoterminatethisAgreementoneyearbeforetheexpirationoftheinitial tenyearperiodoratanytimethereafter. 3.WithrespecttoinvestmentsmadepriortothedateofterminationofthisAgreement,theprovisionsofArticle1to9shallcontinuetobeeffectivetorafurtherperiodoftenyearsfromsuchdateoftermination. 4.ThisAgreementmaybeamendedbywrittenagreementbetweentheContractingParties.AnyamendmentshallenterintoforceunderthesameproceduresrequiredforentryintoforceofthepresentAgreement.”
TheNatureoftheClaims
A.TheFactualBackground
ThissummaryoftheprincipalfactualmattersonwhichtheClaimantsrelyis(exceptwherespecificallyreferencedtoBelgium’sMemorialonJurisdiction)derivedfromtheRequestforArbitrationandtheMemorialandisintended(attheriskofover-simplification)togivethebackgroundtothejurisdictionalissuesandisnotinanywayintendedtodealwiththemeritsoftheclaimortoconstituteanyfindingoffact.
TheFortisgroupwasheadedbytwocompanies:FortisSA/NV,aBelgiansociétéanonyme/naamlozevennootschap,andFortisN.V.,aDutchnaamlozevennootscap5(togetherwithFortisSA/NVbeingreferredtoas“Fortis,”andthegroupofcompaniesconstitutedbyFortisandtheirdirectandindirectsubsidiariesfromtimetotimebeingreferredtoasthe“FortisGroup”).dualholdingcompanystructure.Thesewere,accordingtoBelgium,“FortisUnits,”eachofwhichrepresentedanordinaryshare ofFortisSA/NV(Belgium) and,atthesametime,anordinaryshareofFortisN.V.(Netherlands),sothatwhenashareholderpurchaseda“FortisUnit,”itpurchasedashareofaDutchcompanyandashareofaBelgiancompany,witheachsharerepresenting50%ofthesamebusiness activitiesthroughcross-shareholdings.6
FortiswaslistedontheEuronextBrussels,EuronextAmsterdam,andLuxembourgstockexchanges,andwasactiveinretailbanking,assetmanagement, merchantbankingandinsurance.In2007,whentheClaimantsfirstinvestedintheFortisGroup,itwasthe20thlargestbusinessintheworldbyrevenue,andthethirdlargestcommercialandsavingsbankintheworld,with65,000employees.
Fortiswasdividedintotwosubdivisions,bankingandinsurance.ThebankingbusinesswascarriedonbyFortisBankSA/NV(“FBB”),aBelgiancompany,anditssubsidiariesFortisBanqueLuxembourgSAandFortisBankNederland(Holding)NV.
Fortiswassubjecttoregulatorysupervisionby(i)theCommissionBancaire,FinancièreetdesAssurances(the“CBFA”)andtheBelgianNationalBank(the “BNB”)in Belgium;(ii)theDutchCentralBank,(“DNB”)intheNetherlands;and(iii)theCommissiondeSurveillanceduSecteurFinancier(“CSSF”)inLuxembourg.7
BetweenOctober2007andJuly2008,theClaimantsacquiredsharesinFortisintheopenmarketforanaggregatesumofmorethan€2billion,andbecameFortis’singlelargestshareholder.FromJuly2008,theFortissharesheldbytheClaimantsrepresentedapproximately4.81%ofFortis’issuedshares.8TheClaimantsalsoenteredintoanagreementwithFortisinNovember2007whereby,amongotherthings,theyweregiventherighttoappointadirectortotheFortisBoardofDirectors(“theFortisBoard”).9
rightsissuetoraiseextracapital.TheserumoursgaverisetoconcernsastoFortis’solvency,therebydiscouragingotherbanksfromlendingtoFBB,andposedasubstantialrisktoFBB’sfundingliquidityposition.10
OnSeptember25and26,2008theCBFAadvisedFortisthatitshouldtakeimmediateaction,includingseekingsupportfromastrategicpartner,andtoldFortisthatunlessitfoundastrategicpartnerovertheweekend,FBB’sliquiditypositionmeantthatitwouldnotsurvivetheweekend.BySeptember26,2008,Fortishadlostaccesstotheovernightinterbankmarket,itsinstitutionalclientshadbeguntowithdrawsizeabledeposits,andithadhadtoresorttothemarginallendingfacilityofferedbytheBNBatpunitiveinterestrates.11
OnSeptember28,2008BelgiumagreedwiththeNetherlandsandLuxembourgtocarryoutthefollowingoperationsonthenextday:(1)Belgiumwouldacquirea49.93%stakeinFBB,viaBelgium’ssovereigninvestmentvehicle,LaSociétéFédéraledeParticipationsetd’Investissement(“SFPI”),throughanincreaseinFBB’ssharecapitalinreturnforapaymentof€4.7billion;(2)theNetherlandswouldacquirea49.9%stakeinFBB’sDutchsubsidiary,FBN,for€4billion;and(3)Luxembourgwouldmakea€2.5billionmandatorilyconvertibleloantoFBB’sLuxembourgsubsidiary,FBL,throughconversionofwhichLuxembourgwouldholdastakeof49.9%inFBL. Atthesametime,theBNBagreedtoprovideemergencyliquidityassistancetoFBBintheamountof€14.8billion.TheBoardsofFortisandFBBacceptedtheplansagreedby thegovernments.ThecapitalincreasebyFBBinfavourofBelgiumwasimplementedonSeptember29,2008.TheClaimantssaythattheirindirectinterestinFBBwaseffectivelyhalvedfrom4.81%toapproximately2.41%.ThosetransactionsaredescribedbythePartiesas“theFirstIntervention.”
Atthesametime,BelgiumenteredintonegotiationswiththeFrenchbank,BNPParibas,withaviewtosellingasubstantialstakeinFBB.OnOctober6,2008BelgiumissuedapressreleasestatingthatitwouldtaketheremainingsharesinFBBfor€4.7billionandthatitwouldthentransfer,back-to-back,75%ofthesharesinFBBtoBNPParibasinexchangefornewsharestobeissuedinthelatter,valuedat€8.25billion.Fortis’remaining50%+1sharestakeinFBBwastransferredtoBelgiumonOctober10,2008.Thisisdescribedas“theSecondIntervention.”TheClaimantssaythat,asaresultofthesetransactions,theirinvestmentinFBBwascompletelyexpropriated.13
Belgiumsubsequentlyannouncedaschemetocompensateshareholders,whichwasonlyopentosmallshareholderswhowerenaturalpersonsofBelgian(orotherEU)nationalityorresidence.ProceedingswerebroughtbyFortisshareholdersintheBelgiancourts,whichdecidedthatsomeofthetransactionshadrequiredshareholderapprovalandsuspendedtheiroperation pendingshareholderapproval.
Theshareholders’meetingonFebruary11,2009rejectedthetransactions.AcommitteeofexpertsformedbyorderoftheBelgiancourtreportedthatthetransactionswerein the interestsofFortis.BelgiumrevisedthetermsofthetransactionssoastomakethemmoreattractivetoFortis’shareholders.Fortis’shareholdersultimatelyvotedinfavourof,interalia,thetransferof75%ofFBBfromBelgiumtoBNPParibasatshareholders’meetingsonApril28and29,2009,andthetransactionwithBNPParibaswascompletedinMay2009.14
Sincethen,theFortisGrouphasbeenengagedpurelyinthebusinessofinsurance.Intheyear2012,itstotalincomewasapproximately€15.7billion,whichtheClaimantssayisalmost90%lessthanwhentheyfirstmadetheirinvestmentin2007.
B.TheAllegations
astothestability,transparencyandpredictabilityofBelgium’slegalandbusinessenvironment(includinginparticular,Belgium’sbankingsector);(b)Belgiumfailedtoadoptmorereasonableand/oreffectivealternativestotheInterventions(whichwereextremelyharmfultotheClaimants),andinsteadcoercedFortisintoacceptingBelgium’sexpropriationofasubstantialandsignificantpartoftheClaimants’investment;(c)BelgiumfailedfairlyandfullytocompensatetheClaimantsinconnectionwiththeInterventions,andunjustlyenricheditselfintheprocess;and(d)BelgiumfailedtoaffordtheClaimantsandtheirinvestmentsdueprocessinitsadministrativedecision-making,andarbitrarilyandunreasonablydiscriminatedagainsttheClaimantsandtheirinvestmentsbyfailingtoprovidethesameassistanceitprovidedtooneofFortis’competitors,andtotheClaimants’expropriatedinvestmentitself,butonlyonceithadbeennationalised.15
Inparticular,theClaimantssay16thatBelgiumfailedtoprovideastableandsecurebusinessenvironmentfortheirinvestment,andalsofailedtoimplementpropermeasures,protectionsandsolutionstoprevent,mitigateand/orresolveFortis’liquiditycrisis.TheBelgianregulatorshadawealthofdata,resourcesandpowersattheirdisposaltoassessthesystemicrisksintheBelgianbankingsectorfromwhichliquidityproblemsstem,should haveusedthedatatoidentifygrowingsystemicstrainsinthebankingsector,andshouldhaveurgedbankswithasignificantfundinggap,suchasFortis,toseekmorereliablefundingsourcesorbusinesspartners.
TheBelgianregulatorsshouldhaveintervenedassoonasFortis’liquidityproblemsfirstarose,asanydelayinprovidingstateassistancetoliquidity-shockedbanksislikelytocausesubstantialandunnecessarydestructionofeconomicvalue.BelgiumthenputFortisunderintolerablepressureandeffectivelystrong-armeditintoacceptingthetermsoftheintervention,wherebyBelgiumacquired49.93%ofFBBinreturnforanequityinjectionofjust€4.7billion
TheFirstInterventionwasunnecessary,unfair,unreasonable,inequitableandineffective.The€4.7billionprovidedbyBelgiumcouldnotaddressFBB’sunderlyingliquidityneeds,whichbytheendoftheweekhadreachedapproximately
InOctober2008,whenanotherBelgianbank,Dexia,experiencedasevereliquiditycrisisatalmostthesametimeasFortis,Belgium(withFranceandLuxembourg)providedaguaranteeofinterbanklendingtoDexiaintheamountof€150billion,whichwassufficienttoensurethatDexiaweatheredtheimmediatefinancialstorm,andasaresultDexia’sproblemscouldbeaddressed.OnlyinNovember2008,afterBelgiumhadexpropriatedFBB,diditprovideaguaranteetoFBBofitsinterbanklending.
Belgium’sarbitraryrefusalandfailuretoprovideaguaranteediscriminatedagainstFortisandthustheClaimants,DexiaandFortiswerecomparableinallmaterialrespects,andtherewasthereforenobasisforanydifferentialtreatmentbyBelgium.
TheClaimants’Memorialexplainedthejurisdictionalbasesoftheirclaims.Sofarasmaterialtothequestionofjurisdictionrationetemporis,theClaimantssaidthattheywerebringingtheclaimpursuanttothe1986BITasregardsthesubstantiveobligationsandpursuanttothe2009BITasregardstheproceduralremedy.34
TheClaimants’caseintheirMemorialisthattheeffectofArticles8and10ofthe2009BITisthattheTribunalhasjurisdictionunderthe2009BITbecause(a)the2009BITappliestoinvestmentsmadebeforeitcameintoforce;(b)theonlydisputesexcluded byArticle10arethosewhichwerealreadyunderjudicialorarbitralprocessbeforeDecember1,2009,whenthe2009BITcameintoforce;(c)thereisalegaldisputebetweenaninvestorofoneContractingParty(theClaimants)andtheotherContractingParty(Belgium);and(d)theClaimantshavenotifiedBelgiumofthelegaldispute,andthepartieswereunabletosettlethedisputewithinsixmonths,forthepurposesofArticle8(1)and Article8(2)ofthe2009BIT.35
Thedifferencebetween jurisdictionrationetemporisandthenon-retroactivityof substantiveobligationsiswell-established:SociétéGénéraledeSurveillancev.RepublicofthePhilippines(ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/02/6),DecisiononObjectionstoJurisdiction,January29,2004(El-Kosheri,Crawford,Crivellaro)at[165]-[168](hereinafter“SGSv.Philippines”);SaliniCostruttoriSpAv.HashemiteKingdomofJordan(ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/02/13),DecisiononJurisdiction,November9,2004(Guillaume,Cremades,Sinclair)at[176](hereinafter“Saliniv.Jordan”);ImpregiloSpAv.IslamicRepublicofPakistan(ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/03/3),DecisiononJurisdiction,April22,2005(Guillaume,Cremades,Landau)at[308]etseq(hereinafter“Impregilov.Pakistan”).
werecommitted,i.e.thesubstantiveprovisionsofthe1986BIT,customaryinternationallawandgeneralprinciplesoflaw.36Inparticular,theClaimantsrelyonBelgium’sobligationtoaffordtheClaimants’investmentsfair,justandequitabletreatment;toaffordfullandconstantprotectionandsecurity;andnottoexpropriatetheirinvestmentsunlessitcomplieswithconditions,includingfullcompensationforanytaking.37
ttronicaSiculaSpA(ELSI)(UnitedStatesofAmericav.Italy),1989ICJRep15at42;SociétéGénéralev.DominicanRepublicat[83].ThesilenceofthetextoftheBITwithrespecttodisputespriortoitsentryintoforcedoesnotalter theeffectofthenon-retroactivityprinciple:MCIPowerv.Ecuadorat[61].52
Article10(2)doesnotnecessarilyimplythatdisputeswhichwerenotsubjudiceatthetimeoftheentryintoforceofthe2009BITfallunderthe jurisdictionoftheTribunal underthe2009BIT.ThewordingofArticle8(1)showsthatthepartiesintendedtoactconsistentlywiththeprincipleofnon-retroactivity.Iftheyhadintendedadifferentresult, theycouldhaveusedtheexpressions“hasarisen”or“arisen”orexpresslyextendedtemporaljurisdictionoverpre-existingdisputeswhichwerenotsubjudice.54Article8 mustbereadasawhole,andArticle8(2)cannotbereadinisolationascontainingtheContractingState’sofferofconsenttoarbitration.55
ToreadintoArticle10(2) whatitdoesnotcontainwouldbecontrarytothefundamentalprinciplethatconsentbyaStatetointernationalarbitrationmustbeclearandunambiguous.56IftheClaimantswereright,aBelgianinvestorwouldnowbeabletoarbitrateunderthe1986BITadisputewhicharoseandwasnotifiedunderthe1986BITevenbeforeChina becameapartytotheICSIDConvention.57
ItislikelythatneitherChinanorBelgiumcontemplatedthecaseofaninvestorwhichnotifiedadisputeunderthe1986BITandthenwaitedmuchlongerthan6monthstomakeachoicebetweenrecoursetodomesticcourtsandtointernationalarbitration.Ifsuchasituationhadbeencontemplated,expressprovisionwouldhavebeenmadeforit.Arbitrationunderthe1986BITwasnotonlyinstitutionallydifferent,butwasalsolimitedtodisputesovertheamountofcompensationforexpropriation.58
Belgium’sinterpretationofArticles8(1)and10(2)isconsistentwiththeobjectandpurposeofthe 2009BIT.Thereisnothinginconsistentwiththe 2009BITininterpretingittoexcludepre-existingdisputeswhichwerenotsubjudice.Thetextisthedefinitiveguideastohowthepartieshavechosentoprotectandpromoteinvestment:YbILC,1966,volII,at220;DaimlerFinancialServicesAGv.ArgentineRepublic(ICSIDCase
(hereinafter“DaimlerFinancialServicesv.Argentina”);WintershallAGv.ArgentineRepublic(ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/04/14),Award,December8,2008(Nariman,Bernárdez,Bernardini)at[88](hereinafter“Wintershallv.Argentina”);FraportAGFrankfurtAirportServicesWorldwidev.RepublicofthePhilippines(ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/03/25),Award,August16,2007(Fortier,Cremades,Reisman)at[340](hereinafter“Fraportv.Philippines”).59
ToallowtheClaimantstobringclaimswhichtheyhadasserted sinceOctober2008under
the2009BITwouldbetosanctionabusivetreaty-shopping:LaoHoldingsNVv.LaoPeople’sDemocraticRepublic(ICSIDCaseNo.ARB(AF)/12/6),DecisiononJurisdiction,February21,2014(Binnie,Hanotiau,Stern)at[115],[117](hereinafter“LaoHoldingsv.Laos”).60
NordoesitfollowthattheClaimantshavenoremedyunderthe1986BIT.ThesunsetclauseinArticle14(1)ofthe1986 BITprovidesforthecontinuedeffectofthe1986 BITfor10yearsafteritsexpiration,andtheClaimantscanthereforeinvokethedisputesettlementprovisionsofArticle10ofthe1986BIT,whichbyvirtueofArticle14(4)wouldbeavailablefor10yearsfromexpiration:WalterBauv.Thailandat[9.5(c)],[9.69].61
Theseprovisionshavetobeinterpretedingoodfaithinaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventotheirtermsinthecontextofthe1986BITandthe2009BIT(includingitspreamble),inthelightoftheobjectandpurposeofthe2009BITandagainst thebackgroundofthe1986BIT.
Sometribunalshavefoundtheanswertosimilarquestionsthroughalinguisticanalysis.InImpregilov.Pakistan(Guillaume,Cremades,Landau),thedisputeresolutionclause(Article9)referredto“anydisputearisingbetweenacontracting Partyandtheinvestorsoftheother”(emphasisadded).TheTribunaldecidedthat:“[s]uchlanguage–andthe
92TheICSIDSecretariatwillprovidethePartieswithadetailedfinancialstatementofthecaseaccountassoonasallinvoicesarereceivedandtheaccountisfinal.AnyremainingbalancewillbereimbursedtothePartiesinproportiontothepaymentsthattheyadvancedtoICSID.
