托马斯 E. 多布斯,密西西比州卫生部官员诉美国杰克逊妇女健康组织案(二)

2022-06-27 来源: 作者: 浏览:519

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 43

  Opinion ofthe Court

  American constitutional law as we know it would be unrec-ognizable,andthiswouldbeadifferentcountry.

  No Justice of this Court has ever argued that the Courtshould never overrule a constitutional decision, but overrul-ing a precedent is a serious matter.It is not a step thatshould be taken lightly.Our cases have attempted to pro-vide a framework for deciding when a precedent should beoverruled, and they have identified factors that should beconsideredinmakingsuchadecision.Janusv.State,County, and Municipal Employees, 585 U. S. , –(2018)(slipop.,at34–35);Ramosv.Louisiana,590U.S.

  , – (2020)(KAVANAUGH,J.,concurringinpart)

  (slipop.,at7–9).

  In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of over-rulingRoeandCasey:thenatureoftheirerror,thequalityof their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they im-posedonthecountry,theirdisruptiveeffectonotherareasofthelaw,andtheabsenceofconcretereliance.

  A

  ThenatureoftheCourt’serror.Anerroneousinterpreta-tion of the Constitution is always important, but some aremoredamagingthanothers.

  TheinfamousdecisioninPlessyv.Ferguson,wasone

  ——————

  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) (the exclusionary rule regarding theinadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-ment applies to the States), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25(1949); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944) (racial restrictions onthe right to vote in primary elections violates the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,295 U. S. 45 (1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) (con-gressional power to regulate employment conditions under the Com-merce Clause), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918);Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) (Congress does not have thepower to declare substantive rules of common law; a federal court sittingin diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive state law), overrul-ingSwiftv.Tyson,16Pet.1(1842).

  44 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  such decision.It betrayed our commitment to “equality be-fore the law.”163 U. S., at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).Itwas“egregiouslywrong”onthedayitwasdecided,seeRa-mos, 590 U. S., at (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op.,at7),andastheSolicitorGeneralagreedatoralargument,it should have been overruled at the earliest opportunity,seeTr.ofOralArg.92–93.

  Roewasalsoegregiouslywrongand deeply damaging.For reasons already explained, Roe’s constitutional analysiswas far outside the bounds of any reasonable interpretationof the various constitutional provisions to which it vaguelypointed.

  RoewasonacollisioncoursewiththeConstitutionfromthe day it was decided, Casey perpetuated its errors, andthose errors do notconcernsomearcane corner of the lawof little importance to the American people. Rather, wield-ing nothing but “raw judicial power,” Roe, 410 U. S., at 222(White, J., dissenting), the Court usurped the power to ad-dress a question of profound moral and social importancethat the Constitution unequivocally leaves for the people.Casey described itself as calling both sides of the nationalcontroversy to resolve their debate, but in doing so, Caseynecessarily declared a winning side.Those on the losingside—those who sought to advance the State’s interest infetal life—could no longer seek to persuade their electedrepresentativestoadoptpoliciesconsistentwiththeirviews.The Court short-circuited the democratic process byclosing it to the large number of Americans who dissentedin any respect from Roe. “Roe fanned into life an issue thathas inflamed our national politics in general, and has ob-scuredwithitssmoketheselectionofJusticestothisCourtinparticular,eversince.”Casey,505U. S.,at995–996(opinion of Scalia, J.).Together, Roe and Casey representanerrorthatcannotbeallowedtostand.

  AstheCourt’slandmarkdecisioninWestCoastHotelil-

  lustrates,theCourthaspreviouslyoverruleddecisionsthat

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 45

  Opinion ofthe Court

  wrongly removed an issue from the people and the demo-cratic process.As Justice White later explained, “decisionsthatfindintheConstitutionprinciplesorvaluesthatcan-not fairly be read into that document usurp the people’s au-thority, for such decisions represent choices that the peoplehave never made and that they cannot disavow through cor-rective legislation.For this reason, it is essential that thisCourt maintain the power to restore authority to its properpossessors by correcting constitutional decisions that, on re-consideration,arefoundtobemistaken.”Thornburgh,476

  U. S.,at787 (dissentingopinion).

  B

  The quality of the reasoning.Under our precedents, thequality of the reasoning in a prior case has an importantbearing on whether it should be reconsidered.See Janus,585U.S.,at(slipop.,at38);Ramos,590U.S.,at–

  (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 7–8).In Part II,supra, we explained why Roe was incorrectly decided, butthatdecisionwasmorethanjustwrong.Itstoodonexcep-tionallyweakgrounds.

  Roe found that the Constitution implicitly conferred aright to obtain an abortion, but it failed to ground its deci-sion in text, history, or precedent.It relied on an erroneoushistorical narrative; it devoted great attention to and pre-sumably relied on matters that have no bearing on themeaningoftheConstitution;itdisregardedthefundamen-tal difference between the precedents on which it relied andthequestionbeforetheCourt;itconcoctedanelaboratesetof rules, with different restrictions for each trimester ofpregnancy, but it did not explain how this veritable codecouldbeteasedoutofanythingintheConstitution,thehis-tory of abortion laws, prior precedent, or any other citedsource; and its most important rule (that States cannot pro-tectfetallifepriorto“viability”)wasneverraisedbyany

  46 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  OpinionoftheCourt

  party and has never been plausibly explained.Roe’s rea-soning quickly drew scathing scholarly criticism, even fromsupportersofbroadaccesstoabortion.

  TheCaseyplurality,whilereaffirmingRoe’scentralhold-ing,pointedlyrefrainedfromendorsingmostofitsreason-ing.It revised the textual basis for the abortion right, si-lentlyabandonedRoe’serroneoushistoricalnarrative,andjettisoned the trimester framework.But it replaced thatscheme with an arbitrary “undue burden” test and relied onan exceptional version of stare decisis that, as explained be-low, this Court had never before applied and has never in-vokedsince.

  1

  a

  TheweaknessesinRoe’sreasoningarewell-known.Without any grounding in the constitutional text, history,or precedent, it imposed on the entire country a detailed setof rules much like those that one might expect to find in astatute or regulation.See 410 U. S., at 163–164.Dividingpregnancyintothreetrimesters,theCourtimposedspecialrules for each.During the first trimester, the Court an-nounced, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must beleft to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s at-tending physician.”Id., at 164.After that point, a State’sinterest in regulating abortion for the sake of a woman’shealth became compelling, and accordingly, a State could“regulatetheabortionprocedureinwaysthatarereasona-bly related to maternal health.”Ibid.Finally, in “the stagesubsequent to viability,” which in 1973 roughly coincidedwith the beginning of the third trimester, the State’s inter-est in “the potentiality of human life” became compelling,and therefore a State could “regulate, and even proscribe,abortionexceptwhereitisnecessary,inappropriatemedi-cal judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of themother.”Id.,at164–165.

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 47

  Opinion ofthe Court

  This elaborate scheme was the Court’s own brainchild.Neitherpartyadvocatedthetrimesterframework;nordideither party or any amicus argue that “viability” shouldmarkthepointatwhichthescopeoftheabortionrightandaState’sregulatoryauthorityshouldbesubstantiallytransformed.SeeBriefforAppellantandBriefforAppelleein Roe v. Wade, O. T. 1972, No. 70–18; see also C. Forsythe,Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 127,141(2012).

  b

  Not only did this scheme resemble the work of a legisla-ture, but the Court made little effort to explain how theserules could be deduced from any of the sources on whichconstitutionaldecisionsareusuallybased.We have al-ready discussed Roe’s treatment of constitutional text, andthe opinion failed to show that history, precedent, or anyothercitedsourcesupporteditsscheme.

  Roe featured a lengthy survey of history, but much of itsdiscussion was irrelevant, and the Court made no effort toexplain why it was included.For example, multiple para-graphs were devoted to an account of the views and prac-tices of ancient civilizations where infanticide was widelyaccepted.See 410 U. S., at 130–132 (discussing ancientGreek and Roman practices).49When it came to the mostimportant historical fact—how the States regulated abor-tion when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted—theCourtsaidalmostnothing.ItallowedthatStateshadtight-ened their abortion laws “in the middle and late 19th cen-tury,”id.,at139,butitimpliedthattheselawsmighthave

  ——————

  49 See, e.g., C. Patterson, “Not Worth the Rearing”: The Causes of In-fant Exposure in Ancient Greece, 115 Transactions Am. PhilosophicalAssn. 103, 111–123 (1985); A. Cameron, The Exposure of Children andGreek Ethics, 46 Classical Rev. 105–108 (1932); H. Bennett, The Expo-sureofInfantsinAncientRome,18ClassicalJ.341–351(1923);W.Har-ris,Child-ExposureintheRomanEmpire,84J.RomanStudies1(1994).

  48 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  been enacted not to protect fetal life but to further “a Victo-riansocialconcern”about“illicitsexual conduct,” id., at148.

  Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming consensus ofstatelawsineffectin1868isstriking,andwhat it saidabout the common law was simply wrong.Relying on twodiscredited articles by an abortion advocate, the Court er-roneouslysuggested—contrarytoBracton,Coke,Hale,Blackstone, and a wealth of other authority—that the com-mon law had probably never really treated post-quickeningabortionasacrime.Seeid.,at136(“[I]tnowappear[s]doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a com-mon-lawcrimeevenwithrespecttothedestructionofaquickfetus”).Thiserroneousunderstanding appears tohave played an important part in the Court’s thinking be-causetheopinioncited“thelenityofthecommonlaw”asoneofthefourfactorsthatinformed its decision. Id., at165.

  Aftersurveyinghistory,theopinionspentmanypara-

  graphsconductingthesortoffact-findingthatmightbeun-dertakenbyalegislativecommittee.Thisincludedalengthy account of the “position of the American MedicalAssociation” and “[t]he position of the American PublicHealth Association,” as well as the vote by the AmericanBar Association’s House of Delegates in February 1972 onproposed abortion legislation.Id., at 141, 144, 146 (empha-sis deleted).Also noted were a British judicial decisionhanded down in 1939 and a new British abortion law en-acted in 1967.Id., at 137–138.The Court did not explainwhythesesourcesshedlightonthemeaningoftheConsti-tution,andnotoneofthemadoptedoradvocatedanythingliketheschemethatRoeimposedonthecountry.

  Finally, after allthis, theCourt turnedto precedent. Cit-

  ing a broad array of cases, the Court found support for aconstitutional “right of personal privacy,” id., at 152, but itconflatedtwoverydifferentmeaningsoftheterm:theright

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 49

  Opinion ofthe Court

  to shield information from disclosure and the right to makeand implement important personal decisions without gov-ernmental interference.See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589,599–600 (1977).Only the cases involving this second senseof the term could have any possible relevance to the abor-tion issue, and some of the cases in that category involvedpersonal decisions that were obviously very, very far afield.See Pierce, 268 U. S. 510 (right to send children to religiousschool); Meyer, 262 U. S. 390 (right to have children receiveGermanlanguageinstruction).

  Whatremainedwasahandfulofcaseshavingsomethingto do with marriage, Loving, 388 U. S. 1 (right to marry apersonofadifferentrace),orprocreation,Skinner,316

  U.S.535(rightnottobesterilized);Griswold,381U.S.479(right of married persons to obtain contraceptives); Eisen-stadt, 405 U. S. 438 (same, for unmarried persons).Butnone of these decisions involved what is distinctive aboutabortion:itseffectonwhat Roetermed“potentiallife.”

  When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme itimposed on the country, it asserted that its rules were “con-sistent with” the following: (1) “the relative weights of therespective interests involved,” (2)“the lessons and exam-ples of medical and legal history,” (3) “the lenity of the com-monlaw,”and(4)“thedemandsoftheprofoundproblemsof the present day.”Roe, 410 U. S., at 165.Put aside thesecond and third factors, which were based on the Court’sflawed account of history, and what remains are preciselythe sort of considerations that legislative bodies often takeinto account when they draw lines that accommodate com-peting interests.The scheme Roe produced looked like leg-islation, and the Court provided the sort of explanation thatmightbeexpectedfromalegislativebody.

  c

  WhatRoedidnotprovidewasanycogentjustificationforthelinesitdrew.Why,forexample,doesaStatehaveno

  50 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  authority to regulate first trimester abortions for the pur-pose of protecting a woman’s health?The Court’s only ex-planation was that mortality rates for abortion at that stagewerelowerthanthemortalityratesforchildbirth.Id.,at

  163.But the Court did not explain why mortality rateswere the only factor that a State could legitimately con-sider. Many health and safety regulations aim to avoid ad-verse health consequences short of death.And the Courtdid not explain why it departed from the normal rule thatcourtsdefertothejudgmentsoflegislatures“inareasfraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.”Mar-shallv.UnitedStates,414U.S.417,427(1974).

  AnevenmoreglaringdeficiencywasRoe’sfailuretojus-tify the critical distinction it drew between pre- and post-viabilityabortions.HereistheCourt’sentire explanation:

  “With respect to the State’s important and legitimateinterestinpotentiallife,the‘compelling’pointisatvi-ability.This is so because the fetus then presumablyhas the capability of meaningful life outside the womb.”410U.S.,at163.

  As Professor Laurence Tribe has written, “[c]learly, thismistakes ‘a definition for a syllogism.’”Tribe 4 (quoting Ely924).The definition of a “viable” fetus is one that is capableof surviving outside the womb, but why is this the point atwhich the State’s interest becomes compelling?If, as Roeheld,aState’sinterestinprotectingprenatallifeiscompel-ling “after viability,” 410 U. S., at 163, why isn’t that inter-est “equally compelling before viability”?Webster v. Repro-ductiveHealthServices,492U.S.490,519(1989)(pluralityopinion) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 795 (White, J.,dissenting)). Roe did not say, and no explanation is appar-ent.

  Thisarbitrarylinehasnotfoundmuchsupportamong

  philosophers and ethicists who have attempted to justify arighttoabortion. Somehavearguedthatafetusshouldnot

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 51

  Opinion ofthe Court

  be entitled to legal protection until it acquires the charac-teristics that they regard as defining what it means to be a“person.”Among the characteristics that have been offeredas essential attributes of “personhood” are sentience, self-awareness,theabilitytoreason,orsomecombinationthereof.50Bythislogic,itwouldbeanopenquestionwhether even born individuals, including young children orthoseafflictedwithcertaindevelopmentalormedicalcon-ditions, merit protection as “persons.”But even if one takesthe view that “personhood” begins when a certain attributeor combination of attributes is acquired, it is very hard tosee why viability should mark the point where “personhood”begins.

  The most obvious problem with any such argument is

  that viability is heavily dependent on factors that havenothingtodowiththecharacteristicsofafetus.Oneisthe

  ——————

  50 See, e.g., P. Singer, Rethinking Life & Death 218 (1994) (defining aperson as “a being with awareness of her or his own existence over time,andthecapacitytohavewantsandplansforthefuture”);B.Steinbock,LifeBefore Birth: The MoralandLegalStatus ofEmbryos and Fetuses9–13 (1992) (arguing that “the possession of interests is both necessaryandsufficientformoralstatus”andthatthe“capacityforconsciousawareness is a necessary condition for the possession of interests” (em-phasisdeleted));M.Warren,OntheMoralandLegalStatusofAbortion,57 The Monist 1, 5 (1973) (arguing that, to qualify as a person, a beingmust have at least one of five traits that are “central to the concept ofpersonhood”:(1)“consciousness(ofobjectsandeventsexternaland/orin-ternal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain”; (2) “rea-soning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex prob-lems)”;(3)“self-motivatedactivity(activitywhichisrelativelyindependent of either genetic or direct external control)”; (4) “the capac-ity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite vari-ety of types”; and (5) “the presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness,either individual or racial, or both” (emphasis deleted)); M. Tooley, Abor-tion&Infanticide,2Philosophy& Pub. Affairs37,49(Autumn1972)(arguing that “having a right to life presupposes that one is capable ofdesiring to continue existing as a subject of experiences and other mentalstates”).

  52 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  state of neonatal care at a particular point in time. Due tothe development of new equipment and improved practices,the viability line has changed over the years.In the 19thcentury, a fetus may not have been viable until the 32d or33d week of pregnancy or even later.51When Roe was de-cided,viabilitywasgaugedatroughly28weeks.See410

  U. S., at 160.Today, respondents draw the line at 23 or 24weeks.Brief for Respondents 8.So, according to Roe’s logic,States now have a compelling interest in protecting a fetuswith a gestational age of, say, 26 weeks, but in 1973 Statesdidnothaveaninterestinprotectingan identical fetus.Howcanthatbe?

  Viability also depends on the “quality of the availablemedical facilities.”Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 396(1979).Thus, a 24-week-old fetus may be viable if a womangives birth in a city with hospitals that provide advancedcareforveryprematurebabies,butifthewomantravelstoa remote area far from any such hospital, the fetus may nolonger be viable.On what ground could the constitutionalstatus of a fetus depend on the pregnant woman’s location?And if viability is meant to mark a line having universalmoral significance, can it be that a fetus that is viable in abigcityintheUnitedStateshasaprivilegedmoralstatus

  ——————

  51 See W. Lusk, Science and the Art of Midwifery 74–75 (1882) (explain-ing that “[w]ith care, the life of a child born within [the eighth month ofpregnancy]maybepreserved”);id.,at326(“Wherethechoicelieswiththe physician, the provocation of labor is usually deferred until thethirty-thirdorthirty-fourthweek”);J.Beck,ResearchesinMedicineandMedicalJurisprudence68(2ded.1835)(“Althoughchildrenbornbeforethe completion of the seventh month have occasionally survived, andbeen reared, yet in a medico-legal point of view, no child ought to be con-sideredascapableofsustaininganindependentexistenceuntilthesev-enthmonthhasbeenfullycompleted”);seealsoJ.Baker,TheIncubatorand the Medical Discovery of the Premature Infant, J. Perinatology 322(2000) (explaining that, in the 19th century, infants born at seven toeight months’ gestation were unlikely to survive beyond “the first daysoflife”).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 53

  Opinion ofthe Court

  notenjoyedbyanidenticalfetusinaremoteareaofapoorcountry?

  In addition, as the Court once explained, viability is notreally a hard-and-fast line. Ibid. A physician determininga particular fetus’s odds of surviving outside the wombmust consider “a number of variables,” including “gesta-tional age,” “fetal weight,” a woman’s “general health andnutrition,” the “quality of the available medical facilities,”and other factors.Id., at 395–396.It is thus “only withdifficulty”thataphysiciancanestimatethe“probability”ofa particular fetus’s survival.Id., at 396.And even if eachfetus’s probability of survival could be ascertained with cer-tainty, settling on a “probabilit[y] of survival” that shouldcount as “viability” is another matter.Ibid.Is a fetus via-ble with a 10 percent chance of survival?25 percent?50percent?Can such a judgment be made by a State?AndcanaStatespecifyagestationalagelimitthatappliesinallcases?Or must these difficult questions be left entirely tothe individual “attending physician on the particular factsofthecasebeforehim”?Id.,at388.

  Theviabilityline,whichCaseytermedRoe’scentralrule,

  makesnosense,anditistellingthatothercountriesalmostuniformly eschew such a line.52The Court thus assertedrawjudicialpowertoimpose,asamatterofconstitutionallaw, a uniform viability rule that allowed the States lessfreedom to regulate abortion than the majority of westerndemocraciesenjoy.

  d

  Allinall,Roe’sreasoningwasexceedinglyweak,andac-ademiccommentators,includingthosewhoagreedwiththe

  ——————

  52 AccordingtotheCenterforReproductiveRights,onlytheUnitedStatesandtheNetherlandsuseviabilityasagestationallimitontheavailability of abortion on-request.See Center for Reproductive Rights,TheWorld’sAbortionLaws(Feb.23,2021),https://reproductiverights

  .org/maps/worlds-abortion-laws.

  54 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  decisionasamatterofpolicy,wereunsparingintheircrit-icism.JohnHartElyfamouslywrotethatRoewas“notcon-stitutional law and g[ave] almost no sense of an obligationto try to be.”Ely 947 (emphasis deleted).Archibald Cox,who served as Solicitor General under President Kennedy,commented that Roe “read[s] like a set of hospital rules andregulations” that “[n]either historian, layman, nor lawyerwill be persuaded . . . are part of . . . the Constitution.”TheRole of the Supreme Court in American Government 113–114 (1976).Laurence Tribe wrote that “even if there is aneed to divide pregnancy into several segments with linesthatclearlyidentifythelimitsofgovernmentalpower,‘interest-balancing’ of the form the Court pursues fails tojustify any of the lines actually drawn.”Tribe 4–5.MarkTushnet termed Roe a “totally unreasoned judicial opinion.”Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of ConstitutionalLaw54(1988).SeealsoP.Bobbitt,ConstitutionalFate157(1982); A. Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doc-trine,114Harv.L.Rev.26,110(2000).

  DespiteRoe’s weaknesses, its reach was steadily ex-

  tended in the years that followed.The Court struck downlawsrequiringthatsecond-trimesterabortionsbeper-formed only in hospitals, Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-ductiveHealth,Inc.,462U.S.416,433–439(1983);thatmi-norsobtainparentalconsent,PlannedParenthoodofCentralMo.v.Danforth,428U. S.52,74(1976);thatwomen give written consent after being informed of the sta-tusofthedevelopingprenatallifeandtherisksofabortion,Akron,462U.S.,at442–445;thatwomenwait24hoursforanabortion,id.,at449–451;thataphysiciandeterminevi-ability in a particular manner, Colautti, 439 U. S., at 390–397; that a physician performing a post-viability abortionuse the technique most likely to preserve the life of the fe-tus, id., at 397–401; and that fetal remains be treated in ahumane and sanitary manner, Akron, 462 U. S., at 451–452.

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 55

  Opinion ofthe Court

  JusticeWhitecomplainedthattheCourtwasengagingin“unrestrainedimpositionofitsownextraconstitutionalvalue preferences.” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 794 (dissent-ing opinion). And the United States as amicus curiae askedthe Court to overrule Roe five times in the decade beforeCasey, see 505 U. S., at 844 (joint opinion), and then askedtheCourttooverruleitoncemoreinCaseyitself.

  2

  WhenCaseyrevisitedRoealmost20yearslater,verylit-tle of Roe’s reasoning was defended or preserved.The CourtabandonedanyrelianceonaprivacyrightandinsteadgroundedtheabortionrightentirelyontheFourteenthAmendment’s Due Process Clause.505 U. S., at 846.TheCourt did not reaffirm Roe’s erroneous account of abortionhistory.Infact,none oftheJusticesinthe majoritysaidanything about the history of the abortion right.And as forprecedent, the Court relied on essentially the same body ofcases that Roe had cited.Thus, with respect to the standardgroundsforconstitutionaldecisionmaking—text,history,and precedent—Casey did not attempt to bolster Roe’s rea-soning.

  TheCourtalsomadenorealefforttoremedyoneofthe

  greatest weaknesses in Roe’s analysis: its much-criticizeddiscussion of viability.The Court retained what it calledRoe’s“centralholding”—thataStatemaynotregulatepre-viability abortions for the purpose of protecting fetal life—but it provided no principled defense of the viability line.505 U. S., at 860, 870–871.Instead, it merely rephrasedwhat Roe had said, stating that viability marked the pointatwhich“theindependentexistenceofasecondlifecaninreason and fairness be the object of state protection thatnow overrides the rights of the woman.”505 U. S., at 870.Why“reasonandfairness”demandedthatthelinebedrawn at viability the Court did not explain.And the Jus-ticeswhoauthoredthecontrollingopinionconspicuously

  56 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  failedtosaythattheyagreedwiththeviabilityrule; in-stead, they candidly acknowledged “the reservations [some]of us may have in reaffirming [that] holding of Roe.”Id., at853.

  The controlling opinion criticized and rejected Roe’s tri-mester scheme, 505 U. S., at 872, and substituted a new“undue burden” test, but the basis for this test was obscure.And as we will explain, the test is full of ambiguities and isdifficulttoapply.

  Casey,inshort,eitherrefusedtoreaffirmorrejectedim-portant aspects of Roe’s analysis, failed to remedy glaringdeficiencies in Roe’s reasoning, endorsed what it termedRoe’scentralholdingwhilesuggestingthatamajoritymight not have thought it was correct, provided no new sup-portfortheabortionrightotherthanRoe’sstatusasprece-dent,andimposedanewandproblematictestwithnofirmgroundingin constitutionaltext,history,orprecedent.

  Asdiscussedbelow,Caseyalsodeployedanovelversionofthedoctrineofstaredecisis. See infra, at 64–69. Thisnew doctrine did not account for the profound wrongness ofthe decision in Roe, and placed great weight on an intangi-ble form of reliance with little if any basis in prior case law.Stare decisis does not command the preservation of such adecision.

  C

  Workability.Ourprecedentscounselthatanotherim-portantconsiderationindecidingwhetheraprecedentshould be overruled is whether the rule it imposes is work-able—thatis,whetheritcanbeunderstoodandappliedina consistent and predictable manner.Montejo v. Louisiana,556U.S.778,792(2009);Pattersonv.McLeanCreditUn-

  ion,491U.S.164,173(1989);GulfstreamAerospaceCorp.

  v.MayacamasCorp.,485U.S.271,283–284(1988). Ca-

  sey’s “undue burden” test has scored poorly on the worka-bilityscale.

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 57

  Opinion ofthe Court

  1

  Problems begin with the very concept of an “undue bur-den.”As Justice Scalia noted in his Casey partial dissent,determining whether a burden is “due” or “undue” is “inher-entlystandardless.” 505U.S.,at992;seealsoJuneMedi-

  calServicesL.L.C.v.Russo,591U.S. , (2020)

  (GORSUCH,J.,dissenting)(slipop.,at17)(“[W]hetherabur-denisdeemedunduedependsheavilyonwhichfactorsthejudgeconsidersandhowmuchweightheaccordseachofthem”(internalquotationmarksandalterationsomitted)).The Casey plurality tried to put meaning into the “undueburden”testbysettingoutthreesubsidiaryrules,buttheserulescreatedtheirownproblems.Thefirstruleisthat“aprovisionoflawisinvalid,ifitspurposeoreffectistoplaceasubstantialobstacleinthepathofawomanseekinganabortionbeforethefetusattainsviability.”505U.S.,at878(emphasisadded);seealsoid.,at877.Butwhetherapar-ticularobstaclequalifiesas“substantial”isoftenopentoreasonabledebate.Inthesenserelevanthere,“substan-tial”means“ofampleorconsiderableamount,quantity,orsize.” RandomHouseWebster’sUnabridgedDictionary1897(2ded.2001).Hugeburdensareplainly“substantial,”andtrivialonesarenot,butinbetweentheseextremes,

  thereisawidegrayarea.

  This ambiguity is a problem, and the second rule, whichappliesatallstagesofapregnancy,muddiesthingsfurther.Itstatesthatmeasuresdesigned“toensurethatthewoman’s choice is informed” are constitutional so long asthey do not impose “an undue burden on the right.” Casey,505U.S.,at878.Totheextentthatthisruleappliestopre-viability abortions, it overlaps with the first rule and ap-pears to impose a different standard.Consider a law thatimposes an insubstantial obstacle but serves little purpose.Asappliedtoapre-viabilityabortion,wouldsucharegula-tionbeconstitutionalonthegroundthatitdoesnotimposea“substantialobstacle”?Orwoulditbeunconstitutionalon

  58 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  the ground that it creates an “undue burden” because theburden it imposes, though slight, outweighs its negligiblebenefits?Casey does not say, and this ambiguity would leadtoconfusiondowntheline.CompareJuneMedical,591

  U. S., at–(plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1–2), withid., at–(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 5–6).

  The third rule complicates the picture even more.Underthatrule,“[u]nnecessaryhealthregulationsthathavethepurpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to awoman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on theright.”Casey, 505 U. S., at 878 (emphasis added).This rulecontains no fewer than three vague terms. It includes thetwoalreadydiscussed—“undueburden”and“substantialobstacle”—eventhoughtheyareinconsistent. Anditaddsathirdambiguoustermwhenitrefersto “unnecessaryhealthregulations.”Theterm “necessary” hasa rangeofmeanings—from “essential” to merely “useful.”See Black’sLaw Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979); American Heritage Dic-tionary of the English Language 877 (1971).Casey did notexplainthesenseinwhichthetermisusedinthisrule.

  Inaddition to these problems, one more applies to all

  three rules.They all call on courts to examine a law’s effecton women, but a regulation may have a very different im-pact on different women for a variety of reasons, includingtheir places of residence, financial resources, family situa-tions, work and personal obligations, knowledge about fetaldevelopment and abortion, psychological and emotional dis-position and condition, and the firmness of their desire toobtain abortions.In order to determine whether a regula-tion presents a substantial obstacle to women, a court needsto know which set of women it should have in mind and howmany of the women in this set must find that an obstacle is“substantial.”

  Casey provided no clear answer to these questions. It

  saidthataregulationisunconstitutionalifitimposesa

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 59

  Opinion ofthe Court

  substantial obstacle “in a large fraction of cases in which[it] is relevant,” 505 U. S., at 895, but there is obviously noclear line between a fraction that is “large” and one that isnot.Nor is it clear what the Court meant by “cases inwhich” a regulation is “relevant.”These ambiguities havecausedconfusionanddisagreement.CompareWholeWoman’sHealthv.Hellerstedt,579U. S.582,627–628(2016), with id., at 666–667, and n. 11 (ALITO, J., dissent-ing).

  2

  ThedifficultyofapplyingCasey’snewrulessurfacedinthat very case.The controlling opinion found that Pennsyl-vania’s24-hourwaitingperiodrequirementanditsinformed-consentprovisiondidnotimpose“unduebur-den[s],”Casey,505U. S.,at881–887,butJusticeStevens,applying the same test, reached the opposite result,id., at920–922 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).Thatdidnotbodewell,andthen-ChiefJusticeRehnquistaptly observed that “the undue burden standard presentsnothing more workable than the trimester framework.” Id.,at964–966(dissentingopinion).

  Theambiguityofthe“undueburden”testalsoproduceddisagreement in later cases. In Whole Woman’s Health, theCourt adopted the cost-benefit interpretation of the test,stating that “[t]he rule announced in Casey . . . requiresthat courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortionaccesstogetherwiththebenefitsthoselawsconfer.” 579

  U. S., at 607 (emphasis added).But five years later, a ma-jority of the Justices rejected that interpretation.See JuneMedical,591U. S..FourJusticesreaffirmedWholeWoman’s Health’s instruction to “weigh” a law’s “benefits”against“theburdensitimposesonabortionaccess.” 591

  U. S., at(plurality opinion) (slip op., at 2) (internal quo-tationmarksomitted). ButTHECHIEFJUSTICE—whocast

  60 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  the deciding vote—argued that “[n]othing about Casey sug-gested that a weighing of costs and benefits of an abortionregulation was a job for the courts.” Id., at(opinion con-curring in judgment) (slip op., at 6).And the four Justicesin dissent rejected the plurality’s interpretation of Casey.See591U.S.,at(opinionofALITO,J.,joinedinrelevantpartbyTHOMAS, GORSUCH,and KAVANAUGH, JJ.) (slip op.,at 4); id., at–(opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at15–18); id., at–(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op.,at 1–2) (“[F]ive Members of the Court reject the WholeWoman’sHealthcost-benefitstandard”).

  This Court’s experience applying Casey has confirmedChiefJusticeRehnquist’sprescientdiagnosisthattheundue-burdenstandardwas“notbuilttolast.”Casey,505

  U. S., at 965 (opinion concurring in judgment in part anddissentinginpart).

  3

  TheexperienceoftheCourtsofAppealsprovidesfurtherevidence that Casey’s “line between” permissible and un-constitutional restrictions “has proved to be impossible todraw with precision.” Janus, 585 U. S., at(slip op., at38).

  Casey has generated a long list of Circuit conflicts.Mostrecently,theCourtsofAppealshavedisagreedaboutwhetherthebalancingtestfromWholeWoman’sHealthcorrectly states the undue-burden framework.53They havedisagreedonthelegalityofparentalnotificationrules.54

  ——————

  53 Compare Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F. 4th 430, 440 (CA52021), EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F. 3d418,437(CA62020),andHopkinsv.Jegley,968F. 3d912,915(CA8

  2020) (per curiam), with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box,991F.3d740,751–752(CA72021).

  54 Compare Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F. 3d352,367(CA41998),withPlannedParenthoodofInd.&Ky.,Inc.v.Ad-

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 61

  Opinion ofthe Court

  They have disagreed about bans on certain dilation andevacuation procedures.55They have disagreed about whenanincreaseinthetimeneededtoreachaclinicconstitutesanundueburden.56AndtheyhavedisagreedonwhetheraState may regulate abortions performed because of the fe-tus’srace,sex,ordisability.57

  The Courts of Appeals have experienced particular diffi-cultyinapplyingthelarge-fraction-of-relevant-casestest.They have criticized the assignment while reaching unpre-dictable results.58And they have candidly outlined Casey’smanyotherproblems.59

  ——————

  ams, 937 F. 3d 973, 985–990 (CA7 2019), cert. granted, judgment va-cated,591U.S.(2020),andPlannedParenthood,SiouxFallsClinicv.Miller,63F.3d1452,1460(CA81995).

  55 CompareWholeWoman’sHealthv.Paxton,10F. 4th, at 435–436,with West Ala. Women’s Center v. Williamson, 900 F. 3d 1310, 1319, 1327(CA11 2018), and EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander,960F.3d785,806–808(CA62020).

  56 Compare Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F. 3d 531, 541 (CA92004), with Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 438 F. 3d 595,605(CA62006),andGreenvilleWomen’sClinicv.Bryant,222F.3d157,

  171–172(CA42000).

  57 ComparePreterm-Clevelandv.McCloud,994 F. 3d 512, 520–535(CA62021),withLittleRockFamilyPlanningServs.v.Rutledge,984F.3d682,688–690(CA82021).

  58 See, e.g., Bristol Regional Women’s Center, P.C. v. Slatery, 7 F. 4th478, 485 (CA6 2021); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Strange, 3 F. 4th1240, 1269 (CA11 2021) (per curiam); June Medical Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee,905 F. 3d 787, 814 (CA5 2020), rev’d, 591 U. S.; Preterm-Cleveland,994 F. 3d, at 534; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & Eastern Okla. v. Jegley,864F.3d953,958–960(CA82017);McCormackv.Hertzog,788F.3d

  1017,1029–1030(CA92015);compareAWomansChoice–EastSide

  Womens Clinic v. Newman, 305 F. 3d 684, 699 (CA7 2002) (Coffey, J.,concurring),withid.,at708(Wood,J.,dissenting).

  59See, e.g., Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery, 14

  F. 4th 409, 451 (CA6 2021) (Thapar, J., concurring in judgment in partand dissenting in part); Preterm-Cleveland, 994 F. 3d, at 524; PlannedParenthoodofInd.&Ky.,Inc.v.CommissionerofInd.StateDept.of

  62 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  Casey’s “undue burden” test has proved to be unworkable.“[P]lucked from nowhere,” 505 U. S., at 965 (opinion ofRehnquist,C.J.),it“seemscalculatedtoperpetuategive-it-a-trylitigation”beforejudgesassignedanunwieldyandin-appropriate task.Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S.507, 551 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in partanddissentinginpart).Continuedadherencetothatstandardwouldundermine,notadvance,the“evenhanded,predictable, and consistent development of legal princi-ples.”Payne,501U.S.,at827.

  D

  Effect on other areas of law.Roe and Casey have led tothe distortion of many important but unrelated legal doc-trines,andthateffectprovidesfurthersupportforoverrul-ing those decisions. See Ramos, 590 U. S., at (opinionofKAVANAUGH,J.)(slip op., at 8); Janus, 585 U. S., at(slipop.,at34).

  Members of this Court have repeatedly lamented that “nolegal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by thisCourt when an occasion for its application arises in a caseinvolvingstateregulationofabortion.” Thornburgh,476

  U. S.,at814(O’Connor,J.,dissenting);seeMadsenv.Women’sHealthCenter,Inc.,512U. S.753,785(1994)(Scalia,J.,concurringinjudgmentinpartanddissenting

  ——————

  Health, 888 F. 3d 300, 313 (CA7 2018) (Manion, J., concurring in judg-ment in part and dissenting in part); Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky.,Inc.v.Box,949F. 3d997,999(CA72019)(Easterbrook,J.,concurringindenial of reh’g en banc) (“How much burden is ‘undue’ is a matter of judg-ment,whichdependsonwhattheburdenwouldbe...andwhetherthatburden is excessive (a matter of weighing costs against benefits, whichone judge is apt to do differently from another, and which judges as agroup are apt to do differently from state legislators)”); National Abor-tionFederationv.Gonzales,437F.3d278,290–296(CA22006)(Walker,

  C.J.,concurring);PlannedParenthoodofRockyMountainsServs.Corp.

  v.Owens,287F.3d910,931(CA102002)(Baldock,J.,dissenting).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 63

  Opinion ofthe Court

  in part); Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at 631–633(THOMAS,J.,dissenting);id.,at645–666,678–684(ALITO,

  J., dissenting);JuneMedical,591U. S., at–(GORSUCH,J.,dissenting)(slip op.,at 1–15).

  The Court’s abortion cases have diluted the strict stand-ard for facial constitutional challenges.60They have ig-nored the Court’s third-party standing doctrine.61Theyhave disregarded standard res judicata principles.62Theyhave flouted the ordinary rules on the severability of uncon-stitutional provisions,63as well as the rule that statutesshould be read where possible to avoid unconstitutional-ity.64AndtheyhavedistortedFirstAmendmentdoc-trines.65

  Whenvindicatingadoctrinalinnovationrequirescourtsto engineer exceptions to longstanding background rules,thedoctrine“hasfailedtodeliverthe‘principledandintel-ligible’ development of the law that stare decisis purports tosecure.”Id., at(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 19)(quotingVasquez v.Hillery, 474 U. S.254,265 (1986)).

  E

  Relianceinterests. Welastconsiderwhetheroverruling

  RoeandCaseywillupendsubstantialrelianceinterests.

  ——————

  60CompareUnitedStatesv.Salerno,481U.S.739,745(1987),with

  Casey,505U.S.,at895;seealsosupra,at56–59.

  61CompareWarthv.Seldin,422U.S.490,499(1975),andElkGrove

  UnifiedSchoolDist.v.Newdow,542U.S.1,15,17–18(2004),withJuneMedical,591U.S.,at (ALITO,J.,dissenting) (slipop., at 28),id.,at

  – (GORSUCH,J.,dissenting)(slipop.,at6–7)(collectingcases),and

  WholeWoman’sHealth,579U.S.,at632,n.1(THOMAS,J.,dissenting).

  62Compareid.,at598–606(majorityopinion),withid.,at645–666(ALITO,J.,dissenting).

  63Compareid.,at623–626(majorityopinion),withid.,at644–645(ALITO,J.,dissenting).

  64SeeStenbergv.Carhart,530U.S.914,977–978(2000)(Kennedy,J.,dissenting); id., at996–997(THOMAS,J.,dissenting).

  65SeeHillv.Colorado,530U.S.703,741–742(2000)(Scalia,J.,dis-senting);id., at765 (Kennedy,J.,dissenting).

  64 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  See Ramos, 590 U. S., at(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.)(slipop.,at15);Janus,585U.S.,at–(slipop.,at34–35).

  1

  Traditional reliance interests arise “where advance plan-ning of great precision is most obviously a necessity.”Ca-sey,505U.S.,at856(jointopinion);seealsoPayne,501

  U. S.,at828.In Casey, the controlling opinion concededthat those traditional reliance interests were not implicatedbecause getting an abortion is generally “unplanned activ-ity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually imme-diateaccountofanysuddenrestorationofstateauthorityto ban abortions.”505 U. S., at 856.For these reasons, weagree withthe Casey plurality that conventional, concreterelianceinterestsarenotpresenthere.

  2

  Unable to find reliance in the conventional sense, the con-trolling opinion in Casey perceived a more intangible formof reliance. It wrote that “people [had] organized intimaterelationships and made choices that define their views ofthemselvesandtheirplacesinsociety...inrelianceontheavailabilityofabortionintheeventthatcontraceptionshould fail” and that “[t]he ability of women to participateequally in the economic and social life of the Nation hasbeen facilitated by their ability to control their reproductivelives.”Ibid.But this Court is ill-equipped to assess “gen-eralized assertions about the national psyche.”Id., at 957(opinionofRehnquist,C. J.).Casey’snotionofreliancethusfinds little support in our cases, which instead emphasizevery concrete reliance interests, like those that develop in“cases involving property and contract rights.” Payne, 501U.S.,at828.

  Whenaconcreterelianceinterestisasserted,courtsare

  equippedtoevaluatetheclaim,butassessingthenoveland

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 65

  Opinion ofthe Court

  intangibleformofrelianceendorsedbytheCaseypluralityis another matter.That form of reliance depends on an em-piricalquestionthatishardforanyone—andinparticular,for a court—to assess, namely, the effect of the abortionright on society and in particular on the lives of women.The contending sides in this case make impassioned andconflicting arguments about the effects of the abortion righton the lives of women.Compare Brief for Petitioners 34–36; Brief for Women Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 13–20,29–41, with Brief for Respondents 36–41; Brief for NationalWomen’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 15–32.Thecontending sides also make conflicting arguments about thestatus of the fetus.This Court has neither the authoritynor the expertise to adjudicate those disputes, and the Ca-sey plurality’s speculations and weighing of the relative im-portance of the fetus and mother represent a departurefrom the “original constitutional proposition” that “courtsdo not substitute their social and economic beliefs for thejudgment of legislative bodies.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372U.S.726,729–730(1963).

  Ourdecisionreturnstheissueofabortiontothoselegis-

  lative bodies, and it allows women on both sides of the abor-tion issue to seek to affect the legislative process by influ-encingpublicopinion,lobbyinglegislators,voting,andrunning for office.Women are not without electoral or po-liticalpower.Itisnoteworthythat the percentage ofwomen who register to vote and cast ballots is consistentlyhigher than the percentage of men who do so.66In the lastelectioninNovember2020,women,whomakeuparound

  51.5percentofthepopulationofMississippi,67 constituted

  ——————

  66 See Dept. of Commerce, U. S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau), AnAnalysis of the 2018 Congressional Election 6 (Dec. 2021) (Fig. 5) (show-ing that women made up over 50 percent of the voting population in everycongressionalelectionbetween1978and2018).

  67CensusBureau,QuickFacts,Mississippi(July1,2021),https://www.

  66 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  55.5percentofthevoterswhocastballots.68

  3

  Unable to show concrete reliance on Roe and Casey them-selves,theSolicitorGeneralsuggeststhatoverrulingthosedecisions would “threaten the Court’s precedents holdingthat the Due Process Clause protects other rights.”Brieffor United States 26 (citing Obergefell, 576 U. S. 644; Law-rence, 539 U. S. 558; Griswold, 381 U. S. 479).That is notcorrectforreasonswehavealreadydiscussed.AseventheCasey plurality recognized, “[a]bortion is a unique act” be-cause it terminates “life or potential life.” 505 U. S., at 852;see also Roe, 410 U. S., at 159 (abortion is “inherently dif-ferentfrommaritalintimacy,”“marriage,”or“procrea-tion”).And to ensure that our decision is not misunderstoodor mischaracterized, we emphasize that our decision con-cerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other right.Nothinginthisopinionshouldbeunderstoodtocastdoubtonprecedentsthatdonotconcernabortion.

  IV

  Having shown that traditional stare decisis factors do notweigh in favor of retaining Roe or Casey, we must addressone final argument that featured prominently in the Caseypluralityopinion.

  Theargumentwascastindifferentterms,butstatedsimply, it was essentially as follows.The American people’sbelief in the rule of law would be shaken if they lost respectfor this Court as an institution that decides important casesbasedonprinciple,not“socialandpoliticalpressures.” 505

  U.S.,at865. Thereisaspecialdangerthatthepublicwill

  ——————

  census.gov/quickfacts/MS.

  68 Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November2020, Table 4b: Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and His-panic Origin, for States: November 2020, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-585.html.

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 67

  Opinion ofthe Court

  perceive a decision as having been made for unprincipledreasons when the Court overrules a controversial “water-shed” decision, such as Roe.505 U. S., at 866–867.A deci-sionoverrulingRoewouldbeperceivedashaving beenmade “under fire” and as a “surrender to political pressure,”505 U. S., at 867, and therefore the preservation of publicapproval of the Court weighs heavily in favor of retainingRoe,see505U.S.,at869.

  This analysis starts out on the right foot but ultimatelyveers off course.The Casey plurality was certainly rightthatitisimportantforthepublictoperceivethatourdeci-sionsarebasedonprinciple,andweshouldmakeeveryef-forttoachievethatobjectivebyissuingopinionsthatcare-fullyshowhowaproperunderstandingofthelawleadstothe results we reach.But we cannot exceed the scope of ourauthorityundertheConstitution,andwecannotallowourdecisions to be affected by any extraneous influences suchas concern about the public’s reaction to our work.Cf.Texasv.Johnson,491U.S.397(1989);Brown,347U.S.

  483.That is true both when we initially decide a constitu-tional issue and when we consider whether to overrule aprior decision.As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “TheJudicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from followingpublicopinion,butfromdecidingbyitsbestlightswhetherlegislative enactments of the popular branches of Govern-ment comport with the Constitution. The doctrine of staredecisis is an adjunct of this duty, and should be no moresubject to the vagaries of public opinion than is the basicjudicial task.”Casey, 505 U. S., at 963 (opinion concurringin judgment in part and dissenting in part).In suggestingotherwise, the Casey plurality went beyond this Court’s roleinourconstitutionalsystem.

  TheCaseyplurality“call[ed]thecontendingsidesofana-

  tionalcontroversytoendtheirnationaldivision,”andclaimed the authority to impose a permanent settlement oftheissueofaconstitutionalabortionrightsimplybysaying

  68 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  thatthematterwasclosed.Id.,at 867. That unprece-dented claim exceeded the power vested in us by the Con-stitution.As Alexander Hamilton famously put it, the Con-stitution gives the judiciary “neither Force nor Will.”TheFederalist No. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).Our sole au-thority is to exercise “judgment”—which is to say, the au-thority to judge what the law means and how it should ap-plytothecaseathand.Ibid. TheCourthasnoauthorityto decree that an erroneous precedent is permanently ex-empt from evaluation under traditional stare decisis princi-ples.A precedent of this Court is subject to the usual prin-ciplesofstaredecisisunderwhichadherencetoprecedentisthenormbutnotaninexorablecommand. If the rulewere otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy and Loch-ner would still be the law.That is not how stare decisis op-erates.

  TheCaseypluralityalsomisjudgedthepracticallimitsof

  this Court’s influence.Roe certainly did not succeed in end-ing division on the issue of abortion.On the contrary, Roe“inflamed”anationalissuethathasremainedbitterlydivi-siveforthepasthalfcentury.Casey,505U.S.,at995(opin-ion of Scalia, J.); see also R. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judi-cial Voice, 67 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1185, 1208 (1992) (Roe mayhave “halted a political process,” “prolonged divisiveness,”and “deferred stable settlement of the issue”).And for thepast30years,Caseyhasdonethesame.

  Neither decision has ended debate over the issue of aconstitutional right to obtain an abortion.Indeed, in thiscase, 26 States expressly ask us to overrule Roe and Caseyand to return the issue of abortion to the people and theirelected representatives.This Court’s inability to end de-bate on the issue should not have been surprising.ThisCourt cannot bring about the permanent resolution of arancorous national controversy simply by dictating a settle-ment and telling the people to move on.Whatever influencetheCourtmayhaveonpublicattitudesmuststemfromthe

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 69

  Opinion ofthe Court

  strength of our opinions, not an attempt to exercise “rawjudicial power.”Roe, 410 U. S., at 222 (White, J., dissent-ing).

  We do not pretend to know how our political system orsociety will respond to today’s decision overruling Roe andCasey.And even if we could foresee what will happen, wewould have no authority to let that knowledge influence ourdecision.We can only do our job, which is to interpret thelaw, apply longstanding principles of stare decisis, and de-cidethiscaseaccordingly.

  We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer aright to abortion.Roe and Casey must be overruled, and theauthoritytoregulateabortionmustbereturnedtothepeo-pleandtheirelectedrepresentatives.

  VA1

  Thedissentarguesthatwehave“abandon[ed]”starede-cisis, post, at 30, but we have done no such thing, and it isthedissent’sunderstandingofstaredecisisthatbreakswith tradition.The dissent’s foundational contention isthat the Court should never (or perhaps almost never) over-rule an egregiously wrong constitutional precedent unlesstheCourtcan“poin[t]tomajorlegalorfactualchangesun-dermining [the] decision’s original basis.”Post, at 37.Tosupport this contention, the dissent claims that Brown v.BoardofEducation,347U. S.483,andotherlandmarkcasesoverrulingpriorprecedents“respondedtochangedlawandtochangedfactsandattitudesthathadtakenholdthroughout society.”Post, at 43.The unmistakable impli-cationofthisargumentisthatonlythepassageoftimeandnew developments justified those decisions.Recognitionthat the cases they overruled were egregiously wrong on thedaytheywerehandeddownwasnotenough.

  TheCourthasneveradoptedthisstrangenewversionof

  70 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  stare decisis—and with good reason.Does the dissent reallymaintain that overruling Plessy was not justified until thecountryhadexperiencedmorethanahalf-centuryofstate-sanctioned segregation and generations of Black schoolchildrenhadsufferedallitseffects?Post,at44–45.

  Here is another example.On the dissent’s view, it musthave been wrong for West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,319 U. S. 624, to overrule Minersville School Dist. v. Gobi-tis, 310 U. S. 586, a bare three years after it was handeddown.In both cases, children who were Jehovah’s Wit-nessesrefusedonreligiousgroundstosalutetheflagorre-cite the pledge of allegiance.The Barnette Court did notclaim that its reexamination of the issue was prompted byany intervening legal or factual developments, so if theCourthadfollowedthedissent’snewversionof staredeci-sis, it would have been compelled to adhere to Gobitis andcountenancecontinuedFirstAmendmentviolationsforsomeunspecifiedperiod.

  Precedentsshouldberespected,butsometimestheCourt

  errs, and occasionally the Court issues an important deci-sion that is egregiously wrong.When that happens, staredecisis is not a straitjacket.And indeed, the dissent even-tuallyadmitsthatadecisioncould“beoverruledjustbe-cause it is terribly wrong,” though the dissent does not ex-plainwhenthatwouldbeso.Post,at45.

  2

  Even if the dissent were correct in arguing that an egre-giously wrong decision should (almost) never be overruledunless its mistake is later highlighted by “major legal orfactualchanges,”reexaminationofRoeandCaseywouldbeamply justified.We have already mentioned a number ofpost-Casey developments, see supra, at 33–34, 59–63, butthe most profound change may be the failure of the Caseyplurality’s call for “the contending sides” in the controversyaboutabortion“toendtheirnationaldivision,”505U.S.,at

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 71

  Opinion ofthe Court

  867.That has not happened, and there is no reason to thinkthat another decision sticking with Roe would achieve whatCaseycouldnot.

  Thedissent,however,isundeterred.Itcontendsthatthe“very controversy surrounding Roe and Casey” is an im-portantstaredecisisconsiderationthatrequiresupholdingthose precedents.See post, at 55–57.The dissent charac-terizes Casey as a “precedent about precedent” that is per-manently shielded from further evaluation under tradi-tional stare decisis principles.See post, at 57.But as wehave explained, Casey broke new ground when it treatedthe national controversy provoked by Roe as a ground forrefusing to reconsider that decision, and no subsequent casehasreliedonthatfactor.Ourdecisiontodaysimplyapplieslongstandingstaredecisisfactorsinsteadofapplyingaver-sion of the doctrine that seems to apply only in abortioncases.

  3

  Finally, the dissent suggests that our decision calls intoquestionGriswold,Eisenstadt,Lawrence,and Obergefell.Post, at 4–5, 26–27, n. 8. But we have stated unequivocallythat“[n]othinginthisopinionshouldbeunderstoodtocastdoubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.” Supra,at66.Wehavealsoexplainedwhythatisso:rightsregard-ing contraception and same-sex relationships are inher-entlydifferentfromtherighttoabortionbecausethelatter(as we have stressed) uniquely involves what Roe and Caseytermed“potentiallife.”Roe,410U.S.,at150(emphasisde-leted); Casey, 505 U. S., at 852.Therefore, a right to abor-tion cannot be justified by a purported analogy to the rightsrecognizedinthoseothercasesorby“appealstoabroaderright to autonomy.”Supra, at 32.It is hard to see how wecould be clearer.Moreover, even putting aside that thesecases are distinguishable, there is a further point that thedissentignores:Eachprecedentissubjecttoitsownstare

  72 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  decisis analysis, and the factors that our doctrine instructsus to consider like reliance and workability are different forthesecases thanforourabortionjurisprudence.

  B1

  We now turn to the concurrence in the judgment, whichreproves us for deciding whether Roe and Casey should beretained or overruled.That opinion (which for conveniencewe will call simply “the concurrence”) recommends a “moremeasured course,” which it defends based on what it claimsis“astraightforwardstaredecisisanalysis.”Post,at1(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).The concurrence would “leavefor another day whether to reject any right to an abortionat all,” post, at 7, and would hold only that if the Constitu-tion protects any such right, the right ends once womenhavehad“areasonableopportunity”toobtainanabortion,post,at1.Theconcurrencedoesnotspecifywhatperiodoftime is sufficient to provide such an opportunity, but itwould hold that 15 weeks, the period allowed under Missis-sippi’slaw,isenough—atleast“absentrarecircum-stances.”Post,at2,10.

  Thereareseriousproblemswiththisapproach,anditis

  revealing that nothing like it was recommended by eitherparty.As we have recounted, both parties and the SolicitorGeneralhaveurgeduseithertoreaffirmor overrule Roeand Casey.See supra, at 4–5.And when the specific ap-proach advanced by the concurrence was broached at oralargument, both respondents and the Solicitor General em-phatically rejected it.Respondents’ counsel termed it “com-pletely unworkable” and “less principled and less workablethan viability.”Tr. of Oral Arg. 54.The Solicitor Generalarguedthatabandoningtheviability line would leavecourts and others with “no continued guidance.”Id., at 101.Whatismore,theconcurrencehasnotidentifiedanyofthe

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 73

  Opinion ofthe Court

  morethan130amicusbriefsfiledinthiscasethatadvo-cated its approach. The concurrence would do exactly whatit criticizes Roe for doing: pulling “out of thin air” a test that“[n]opartyoramicusaskedtheCourttoadopt.” Post,at3.

  2

  Theconcurrence’smostfundamentaldefectisitsfailureto offer any principled basis for its approach.The concur-rencewould“discar[d]”“therulefromRoeandCaseythatawoman’s right to terminate her pregnancy extends up to thepointthatthefetusisregardedas‘viable’outsidethewomb.”Post, at 2. But this rule was a critical componentoftheholdingsinRoeandCasey,andstaredecisisis“adoc-trineofpreservation,nottransformation,”CitizensUnited

  v.FederalElectionComm’n,558U. S.310,384(2010)(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring).Therefore, a new rule thatdiscards the viability rule cannot be defended on stare deci-sisgrounds.

  The concurrence concedes that its approach would “not beavailable”if“therationaleofRoeandCaseywereinextrica-bly entangled with and dependent upon the viability stand-ard.”Post, at 7.But the concurrence asserts that the via-bility line is separable from the constitutional right theyrecognized, and can therefore be “discarded” without dis-turbing any past precedent.Post, at 7–8.That is simplyincorrect.

  Roe’s trimester rule was expressly tied to viability, see410 U. S., at 163–164, and viability played a critical role inlaterabortiondecisions.Forexample,inPlannedParenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, theCourt reiterated Roe’s rule that a “State may regulate anabortion to protect the life of the fetus and even may pro-scribeabortion”at“thestagesubsequenttoviability.” 428

  U. S., at 61 (emphasis added).The Court then rejected achallenge to Missouri’s definition of viability, holding thattheState’sdefinitionwasconsistentwithRoe’s. 428U.S.,

  74 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  at 63–64.If viability was not an essential part of the ruleadopted in Roe, the Court would have had no need to makethatcomparison.

  The holding in Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, is evenmore instructive.In that case, the Court noted that priorcases had “stressed viability” and reiterated that “[v]iabil-ity is the critical point” under Roe. 439 U. S., at 388–389.It then struck down Pennsylvania’s definition of viability,id., at 389–394, and it is hard to see how the Court couldhave done that if Roe’s discussion of viability was not partofitsholding.

  WhentheCourtreconsideredRoeinCasey, it left nodoubtabouttheimportanceoftheviabilityrule.Itde-scribed the rule as Roe’s “central holding,” 505 U. S., at 860,and repeatedly stated that the right it reaffirmed was “theright of the woman to choose to have an abortion before vi-ability.”Id., at 846 (emphasis added).See id., at 871 (“Thewoman’srighttoterminateherpregnancybeforeviabilityis the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule oflaw and a component of liberty we cannot renounce” (em-phasisadded));id.,at872(A“womanhasarighttochoosetoterminateorcontinueherpregnancybeforeviability”(emphasis added)); id., at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibitany woman from making the ultimate decision to terminateherpregnancybeforeviability”(emphasisadded)).

  Oursubsequent cases have continued to recognize the

  centrality of the viability rule.See Whole Women’s Health,579 U. S., at 589–590 (“[A] provision of law is constitution-ally invalid, if the ‘purpose or effect’ of the provision ‘is toplace a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seekingan abortion before the fetus attains viability’ ” (emphasis de-letedandadded));id.,at627(“[W]enowuse‘viability’astherelevantpointatwhichaStatemaybeginlimitingwomen’s access to abortion for reasons unrelated to mater-nalhealth”(emphasisadded)).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 75

  Opinion ofthe Court

  Not only is the new rule proposed by the concurrence in-consistentwithCasey’sunambiguous“language,”post,at8,itisalsocontrarytothejudgmentinthatcaseandlaterabortioncases.InCasey,theCourt held that Pennsylva-nia’s spousal-notification provision was facially unconstitu-tional,notjustthatitwasunconstitutionalasappliedtoabortionssoughtpriortothetimewhenawomanhashada reasonable opportunity to choose.See 505 U. S., at 887–898.The same is true of Whole Women’s Health, which heldthatcertainrulesthatrequiredphysiciansperformingabortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospitalwere facially unconstitutional because they placed “a sub-stantialobstacleinthepathofwomenseekingapreviabil-ityabortion.”579U.S.,at591(emphasisadded).

  Forallthesereasons,staredecisiscannotjustifythenew

  “reasonable opportunity” rulepropounded by the concur-rence.If that rule is to become the law of the land, it muststandonitsown,buttheconcurrencemakesnoattempttoshow that this rule represents a correct interpretation ofthe Constitution.The concurrence does not claim that theright to a reasonable opportunity to obtain an abortion is“‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” and“‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”Glucksberg,521 U. S., at 720–721. Nor does it propound any other the-orythatcouldshowthattheConstitutionsupportsitsnewrule.And if the Constitution protects a woman’s right toobtain an abortion, the opinion does not explain why thatright should end after the point at which all “reasonable”women will have decided whether to seek an abortion.While the concurrence is moved by a desire for judicial min-imalism,“wecannotembraceanarrowgroundofdecisionsimply because it is narrow; it must also be right.” CitizensUnited, 558 U. S., at 375 (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring).Forthe reasons that we have explained, the concurrence’s ap-proachisnot.

  76 DOBBSv. JACKSON WOMEN’SHEALTH ORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  3

  The concurrence would “leave for another day whether toreject any right to an abortion at all,” post, at 7, but “an-otherday”wouldnotbelongincoming.SomeStateshaveset deadlines for obtaining an abortion that are shorterthan Mississippi’s.See, e.g., Memphis Center for Reproduc-tive Health v. Slatery, 14 F. 4th, at 414 (considering lawwith bans “at cascading intervals of two to three weeks” be-ginning at six weeks), reh’g en banc granted, 14 F. 4th 550(CA6 2021). If we held only that Mississippi’s 15-week ruleis constitutional, we would soon be called upon to pass onthe constitutionality of a panoply of laws with shorter dead-lines or no deadline at all.The “measured course” chartedbytheconcurrencewouldbefraughtwithturmoiluntiltheCourtansweredthequestionthattheconcurrenceseekstodefer.

  EveniftheCourtultimatelyadoptedthenewrulesug-

  gested by the concurrence, we would be faced with the dif-ficultproblemofspellingoutwhatitmeans.Forexample,if the period required to give women a “reasonable” oppor-tunitytoobtainanabortionwerepegged,astheconcur-rence seems to suggest, at the point when a certain percent-age of women make that choice, see post, at 1–2, 9–10, wewould have to identify the relevant percentage. It wouldalso be necessary to explain what the concurrence meanswhen it refers to “rare circumstances” that might justify anexception.Post, at 10.And if this new right aims to givewomenareasonableopportunitytogetan abortion, itwouldbenecessarytodecidewhetherfactorsotherthanpromptness in deciding might have a bearing on whethersuchanopportunitywasavailable.

  Insum,theconcurrence’squestforamiddlewaywould

  onlyputoffthedaywhenwewouldbeforcedtoconfrontthequestion we now decide.The turmoil wrought by Roe andCaseywouldbeprolonged. Itisfarbetter—forthisCourt

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 77

  Opinion ofthe Court

  andthecountry—tofaceuptotherealissuewithoutfur-therdelay.

  VI

  We must now decide what standard will govern if stateabortionregulationsundergoconstitutionalchallengeandwhether the law before us satisfies the appropriate stand-ard.

  A

  Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-priatestandardforsuchchallenges.Aswehaveexplained,procuring an abortion is not a fundamental constitutionalrightbecausesucharighthasnobasisintheConstitution’stextorinourNation’shistory.Seesupra,at8–39.

  ItfollowsthattheStatesmayregulateabortionforlegit-imate reasons, and when such regulations are challengedunder the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their so-cial and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bod-ies.”Ferguson,372U.S.,at729–730;seealsoDandridge

  v.Williams,397U.S.471,484–486(1970);UnitedStatesv.Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938).That re-spect for a legislature’s judgment applies even when thelaws at issue concern matters of great social significanceand moral substance. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ.of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 365–368 (2001) (“treatmentof the disabled”); Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 728 (“assistedsuicide”); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-guez, 411 U. S. 1, 32–35, 55 (1973) (“financing public edu-cation”).

  A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfarelaws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.”Hel-ler v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319 (1993).It must be sustainedif there is a rational basis on which the legislature couldhavethoughtthatitwouldservelegitimatestateinterests.Id.,at320;FCCv.BeachCommunications,Inc.,508U.S.

  78 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  Opinion ofthe Court

  307,313(1993);NewOrleansv.Dukes,427U.S.297,303

  (1976)(percuriam);Williamsonv.LeeOpticalofOkla.,Inc.,348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955).These legitimate interests in-clude respect for and preservation of prenatal life at allstagesofdevelopment,Gonzales,550U.S.,at157–158;theprotection of maternal health and safety; the elimination ofparticularly gruesome or barbaric medical procedures; thepreservationoftheintegrityofthemedicalprofession;themitigation of fetal pain; and the prevention of discrimina-tion on the basis of race, sex, or disability.See id., at 156–157;Roe,410U.S.,at150;cf.Glucksberg,521U.S.,at728–731(identifyingsimilarinterests).

  B

  TheselegitimateinterestsjustifyMississippi’sGesta-tional Age Act.Except “in a medical emergency or in thecase of a severe fetal abnormality,” the statute prohibitsabortion“iftheprobablegestationalageoftheunbornhu-manbeinghasbeendeterminedtobegreaterthanfifteen

  (15) weeks.”Miss. Code Ann. §41–41–191(4)(b).The Mis-sissippi Legislature’s findings recount the stages of “humanprenatal development” and assert the State’s interest in“protecting the life of the unborn.”§2(b)(i).The legislaturealso found that abortions performed after 15 weeks typi-cally use the dilation and evacuation procedure, and thelegislature found the use of this procedure “for nonthera-peutic or elective reasons [to be] a barbaric practice, dan-gerous for the maternal patient, and demeaning to the med-icalprofession.”§2(b)(i)(8);seealsoGonzales,550U.S.,at135–143 (describing such procedures).These legitimate in-terestsprovidearationalbasisfortheGestationalAgeAct,and it follows that respondents’ constitutional challengemustfail.

  VII

  Weendthisopinionwherewebegan.Abortionpresents

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 79

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  aprofoundmoralquestion.TheConstitutiondoesnotpro-hibitthecitizensofeachStatefromregulatingorprohibit-ing abortion.Roe and Casey arrogated that authority.Wenow overrule those decisions and return that authority tothepeopleandtheirelectedrepresentatives.

  ThejudgmentoftheFifthCircuit is reversed, and thecaseisremandedforfurtherproceedingsconsistent withthisopinion.

  Itissoordered.

  APPENDICESA

  This appendix contains statutes criminalizing abortion atall stages of pregnancy in the States existing in 1868.Thestatutesappearinchronologicalorder. 1.Missouri(1825):Sec.12.“Thateverypersonwhoshallwilfullyandmaliciouslyadministerorcausetobeadministeredtoor taken by any person, any poison, or other noxious,poisonous or destructive substance or liquid, with anintentiontoharmhimorhertherebytomurder,ortherebytocauseorprocurethemiscarriageofanywoman then being with child, and shall thereof be dulyconvicted,shallsufferimprisonmentnotexceedingseven years, and be fined not exceeding three thousanddollars.”69 2.Illinois(1827):Sec. 46.“Every person who shall wilfully and mali-ciously administer, or cause to be administered to, ortakenbyanyperson,anypoison,orothernoxiousor

  ——————

  69 1825 Mo. Laws p. 283 (emphasis added); see also, Mo. Rev. Stat., Art.II, §§10, 36 (1835) (extending liability to abortions performed by instru-ment and establishing differential penalties for pre- and post-quickeningabortion)(emphasisadded).

  80 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  destructivesubstanceorliquid,withanintentiontocause the death of such person, or to procure the mis-carriage of any woman, then being with child, and shallthereofbedulyconvicted,shallbeimprisonedfor aterm not exceeding three years, and be fined in a sumnotexceedingonethousanddollars.”70 3.NewYork(1828):Sec. 9.“Every person who shall administer to anywomanpregnantwithaquickchild,anymedicine,drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrument or other means, with intent thereby to de-stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall havebeen advised by two physicians to be necessary for suchpurpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of suchmother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-slaughterintheseconddegree.”

  Sec.21.“Everypersonwhoshallwillfullyadminis-tertoany pregnantwoman,anymedicine,drug,sub-stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrumentofothermeanswhatever,withintentthereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,unless the same shall have been necessary to preservethe life of such woman, or shall have been advised bytwo physicians to be necessary for that purpose; shall,uponconviction,bepunishedbyimprisonmentinacounty jail not more than one year, or by fine not ex-ceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine andimprisonment.”71

  ——————

  70Ill.Rev.Code§46(1827)(emphasisadded);seealsoIll.Rev.Code

  §46 (1833) (same); 1867 Ill. Laws p. 89 (extending liability to abortions“by means of any instrument[s]” and raising penalties to imprisonment“notlessthantwonormorethantenyears”).

  71N.Y.Rev.Stat.,pt.4,ch.1,Tit.2,§9(emphasisadded);Tit.6,§21

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 81

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt 4.Ohio(1834):Sec.1.“BeitenactedbytheGeneral Assembly ofState of Ohio, That any physician, or other person, whoshallwilfullyadministertoanypregnantwomananymedicine, drug, substance, or thing whatever, or shalluse any instrument or other means whatever, with in-tenttherebytoprocurethemiscarriageofanysuchwoman, unless the same shall have been necessary topreserve the life of such woman, or shall have been ad-vised by two physicians to be necessary for that pur-pose, shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprison-ment in the county jail not more than one year, or byfine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both suchfineandimprisonment.”

  Sec.2.“Thatanyphysician,orother person, whoshall administer to any woman pregnant with a quickchild,anymedicine,drug,orsubstancewhatever,orshalluseoremployanyinstrument,orothermeans,withintenttherebytodestroysuchchild,unlessthesame shall have been necessary to preserve the life ofsuch mother, or shall have been advised by two physi-cians to be necessary for such purpose, shall, in case ofthedeathofsuchchildormotherinconsequencethereof,bedeemedguiltyofhighmisdemeanor,and,upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the pen-itentiary not more than seven years, nor less than oneyear.”72 5.Indiana(1835):Sec.3.“Thateverypersonwhoshallwilfullyadmin-istertoanypregnantwoman,anymedicine,drug,sub-stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrumentorothermeanswhatever,withintent

  ——————

  (1828)(emphasisadded);1829N.Y.Lawsp.19(codifyingtheseprovi-sionsintherevisedstatutes).

  721834OhioLawspp.20–21(emphasisdeletedandadded).

  82 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,unless the same shall have been necessary to preservethe life of such woman, shall upon conviction be pun-ished by imprisonment in the county jail any term of[time] not exceeding twelve months and be fined anysumnotexceedingfivehundreddollars.”73 6.Maine(1840):Sec. 13.“Every person, who shall administer to anywomanpregnantwithchild, whether such child bequickornot,anymedicine,drugorsubstancewhat-ever, or shall use or employ any instrument or othermeans whatever, with intent to destroy such child, andshall thereby destroy such child before its birth, unlessthe same shall have been done as necessary to preservethe life of the mother, shall be punished by imprison-mentinthestateprison,notmorethanfiveyears,orbyfine,notexceedingonethousanddollars,andim-prisonmentinthecountyjail,notmorethanoneyear.”

  Sec. 14.“Every person, who shall administer to anywoman,pregnantwith child, whether such child shallbe quick or not, any medicine, drug or substance what-ever, or shall use or employ any instrument or othermeanswhatever,withintenttherebytoprocurethemiscarriage of such woman, unless the same shall havebeen done, as necessary to preserve her life, shall bepunished by imprisonment in the county jail, not morethan one year, or by fine, not exceeding one thousanddollars.”74 7.Alabama(1841):Sec.2.“Everypersonwhoshallwilfullyadministertoanypregnantwomananymedicines,drugs,sub-stanceorthingwhatever,orshalluseandemployany

  ——————

  731835Ind.Lawsp.66(emphasisadded).

  74Me.Rev.Stat.,Tit.12,ch.160,§§13–14(1840)(emphasisadded).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 83

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  instrument or means whatever with intent thereby toprocurethemiscarriageofsuchwoman,unless thesameshall benecessarytopreserveherlife, orshallhave been advised by a respectable physician to be nec-essary for that purpose, shall upon conviction, be pun-ishedbyfinenotexceedingfivehundreddollars,andby imprisonment in the county jail, not less than three,andnotexceedingsixmonths.”75 8.Massachusetts(1845):Ch. 27.“Whoever, maliciously or without lawful jus-tification, withintent to cause and procure the miscar-riageofawomanthenpregnantwithchild,shallad-minister to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct herto take or swallow, any poison, drug, medicine or nox-ious thing, or shall cause or procure her with like in-tent, to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine ornoxiousthing;andwhoevermaliciouslyandwithoutlawful justification, shall use any instrument or meanswhatever with the like intent, and every person, withthe like intent, knowingly aiding and assisting such of-fender or offenders, shall be deemed guilty of felony, ifthe woman die in consequence thereof, and shall be im-prisoned not more than twenty years, nor less than fiveyearsintheStatePrison; and if the woman doth notdieinconsequencethereof,suchoffender shall beguilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by im-prisonmentnotexceedingsevenyears,norless thanone year, in the state prison or house of correction, orcommon jail, and by fine not exceeding two thousanddollars.”76 9.Michigan(1846):Sec.33.“Everypersonwhoshalladministertoany

  ——————

  751841Ala.Actsp.143(emphasisadded).

  761845Mass.Actsp.406(emphasisadded).

  84 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  womanpregnantwithaquickchild,anymedicine,drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrument or other means, with intent thereby to de-stroy such child, unless the same shall have been nec-essary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall havebeen advised by two physicians to be necessary for suchpurpose, shall, in case the death of such child or of suchmother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-slaughter.”

  Sec. 34. “Every person who shall wilfully administertoanypregnantwomananymedicine,drug,substanceor thing whatever, or shall employ any instrument orother means whatever, with intent thereby to procurethemiscarriageofanysuchwoman,unlessthesameshall have been necessary to preserve the life of suchwoman,orshallhavebeenadvisedbytwophysiciansto be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon conviction,be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not morethan one year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundreddollars,orbybothsuchfineandimprisonment.”77 10.Vermont(1846):Sec. 1. “Whoever maliciously, or without lawful jus-tificationwithintenttocauseandprocurethemiscar-riage of a woman, then pregnant with child, shall ad-minister to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct herto take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine or nox-ious thing, or shall cause or procure her, with like in-tent, to take or swallow any poison, drug, medicine ornoxious thing, and whoever maliciously and withoutlawfuljustification,shalluseanyinstrumentormeanswhatever, with the like intent, and every person, withthelikeintent,knowinglyaidingandassistingsuchof-fenders,shallbedeemedguiltyoffelony,ifthewomandieinconsequencethereof,andshallbeimprisonedin

  ——————

  77Mich.Rev.Stat.,Tit.30,ch.153,§§33–34(1846)(emphasisadded).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 85

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  the state prison, not more than ten years, nor less thanfiveyears;andifthewomandoesnotdieinconse-quencethereof,suchoffendersshallbedeemedguiltyof a misdemeanor; and shall be punished by imprison-ment in the state prison not exceeding three years, norless than one year, and pay a fine not exceeding twohundreddollars.”78 11.Virginia(1848):Sec. 9.“Any free person who shall administer to anypregnantwoman,anymedicine,drugorsubstancewhatever,oruseoremployanyinstrumentorothermeanswithintenttherebytodestroythechildwithwhichsuchwomanmaybepregnant,ortoproduceabortion or miscarriage, and shall thereby destroy suchchild, or produce such abortion or miscarriage, unlessthe same shall have been done to preserve the life ofsuch woman, shall be punished, if the death of a quickchild be thereby produced, by confinement in the peni-tentiary, for not less than one nor more than five years,orifthedeathofachild,notquick,betherebypro-duced, by confinement in the jail for not less than onenormorethantwelvemonths.”79 12.NewHampshire(1849):Sec. 1.“That every person, who shall wilfully admin-ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrument or means whatever with intent thereby toprocure the miscarriage of any such woman, unless thesame shall have been necessary to preserve the life ofsuch woman, or shall have been advised by two physi-cians to be necessary for that purpose, shall, upon con-viction,bepunishedbyimprisonmentinthecountyjail

  ——————

  781846Vt.Acts&Resolvespp.34–35(emphasisadded).

  791848Va.Actsp.96(emphasisadded).

  86 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  not more than one year, or by a fine not exceeding onethousanddollars,orby bothsuchfineandimprison-mentatthediscretionoftheCourt.”

  Sec.2.“Everypersonwhoshalladministertoanywomanpregnantwith a quick child, any medicine,drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrument or means whatever, with intent thereby todestroysuchchild,unlessthesameshallhavebeennecessary to preserve the life of such woman, or shallhavebeenadvisedbytwophysicianstobenecessaryforsuchpurpose,shall,uponconviction,bepunishedby fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and by con-finement to hard labor not less than one year, nor morethantenyears.”80 13.NewJersey(1849):“That if any person or persons, maliciously or with-out lawful justification, with intent to cause and pro-curethemiscarriageofawomanthenpregnantwithchild, shall administer to her, prescribe for her, or ad-vise or direct her to take or swallow any poison, drug,medicine, or noxious thing; and if any person or per-sons maliciously, and without lawful justification, shalluse any instrument or means whatever, with the likeintent;andeveryperson,withthelikeintent,know-inglyaidingandassistingsuchoffenderoroffenders,shall, on conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty of a highmisdemeanor;andifthewomandieinconsequencethereof,shallbepunishedbyfine,notexceedingonethousand dollars, or imprisonment at hard labour forany term not exceeding fifteen years, or both; and if thewoman doth not die in consequence thereof, such of-fendershall,onconvictionthereof,beadjudgedguiltyofamisdemeanor,andbepunishedbyfine,notexceed-

  ——————

  801849N.H.Lawsp.708(emphasisadded).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 87

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  ing five hundred dollars, or imprisonment at hard la-bour,foranytermnotexceedingsevenyears,orboth.”81 14.California(1850):Sec. 45.“And every person who shall administer orcausetobeadministeredortaken,anymedicalsub-stances,orshalluseorcausetobeusedanyinstru-ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-carriageofanywomanthenbeingwithchild,andshallbe thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-onment in the State Prison for a term not less than twoyears, nor more than five years: Provided, that no phy-sician shall be affected by the last clause of this section,who,inthedischargeofhisprofessionalduties,deemsitnecessarytoproducethemiscarriageofanywomaninordertosaveherlife.”82 15.Texas(1854):Sec. 1.“If any person, with the intent to procure themiscarriage of any woman being with child, unlawfullyand maliciously shall administer to her or cause to betaken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shalluse any instrument or any means whatever, with likeintent, every such offender, and every person counsel-ling or aiding or abetting such offender, shall be pun-ished by confinement to hard labor in the Penitentiarynotexceedingtenyears.”83 16.Louisiana(1856):Sec.24.“Whoevershallfeloniouslyadministerorcause to be administered any drug, potion, or any otherthingtoanywoman,forthepurposeofprocuringaprematuredelivery,andwhoevershalladministeror

  ——————

  811849N.J.Lawspp.266–267(emphasisadded).

  821850Cal.Stats.p.233(emphasisaddedanddeleted).

  831854Tex.Gen.Lawsp.58(emphasisadded).

  88 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  cause to be administered to any woman pregnant withchild, any drug, potion, or any other thing, for the pur-poseofprocuringabortion,oraprematuredelivery,shall be imprisoned at hard labor, for not less than one,normorethantenyears.”84 17.Iowa (1858):Sec. 1.“That every person who shall willfully admin-ister to any pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, sub-stance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ anyinstrument or other means whatever, withthe intentthereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,unlessthesameshallbenecessarytopreservethelifeof such woman, shall upon conviction thereof, be pun-ished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term ofnot exceeding one year, and be fined in a sum not ex-ceedingonethousanddollars.”85 18.Wisconsin(1858):Sec. 11.“Every person who shall administer to anywomanpregnantwithachildanymedicine,drug,orsubstance whatever, or shall use or employ any instru-mentorothermeans,withintenttherebytodestroysuchchild,unlessthesameshallhavebeennecessaryto preserve the life of such mother, or shall have beenadvised by two physicians to be necessary for such pur-pose, shall, in case the death of such child or of suchmother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of man-slaughterintheseconddegree.”86

  Sec. 58.“Every person who shall administer to anypregnant woman, or prescribe for any such woman, oradvise or procure any such woman to take, any medi-cine,drug,orsubstanceorthingwhatever,orshalluse

  ——————

  84La.Rev.Stat.§24(1856)(emphasisadded).

  851858IowaActsp.93(codifiedinIowaRev.Laws§4221)(emphasisadded).

  86Wis.Rev.Stat.,ch.164,§11,ch.169,§58(1858)(emphasisadded).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 89

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  or employ any instrument or other means whatever, oradviseorprocurethesametobeused,withintentthereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,shalluponconvictionbepunishedbyimprisonmentinacountyjail,notmorethanoneyear nor less thanthreemonths,orbyfine,notexceedingfivehundreddollars, or by both fine and imprisonment, at the dis-cretionofthecourt.” 19.Kansas(1859):Sec. 10.“Every person who shall administer to anywoman,pregnantwithaquickchild,anymedicine,drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or employanyinstrumentorothermeans,withintenttherebytodestroy such child, unless the same shall have beennecessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shallhave been advised by a physician to be necessary forthat purpose, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughterintheseconddegree.”

  Sec. 37.“Every physician or other person who shallwilfully administer to any pregnant woman any medi-cine, drug or substance whatsoever, or shall use or em-ploy any instrument or means whatsoever, with intentthereby to procure abortion or the miscarriage of anysuch woman, unless the same shall have been neces-sary to preserve the life of such woman, or shall havebeenadvisedbyaphysiciantobe necessary forthatpurpose, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of amisdemeanor,andpunishedbyimprisonmentinacounty jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not ex-ceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine andimprisonment.”87 20.Connecticut(1860):Sec.1.“Thatanypersonwithintenttoprocurethe

  ——————

  871859Kan.Lawspp.233,237(emphasisadded).

  90 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  miscarriage or abortion of any woman, shall give or ad-ministertoher,prescribeforher,oradvise,ordirect,or cause or procure her to take, any medicine, drug orsubstance whatever, or use or advise the use of any in-strument,orothermeanswhatever,withthelikein-tent, unless the same shall have been necessary to pre-serve the life of such woman, or of her unborn child,shall be deemed guilty of felony, and upon due convic-tion thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in theConnecticutstateprison,notmorethanfiveyearsorless than one year, or by a fine of one thousand dollars,orboth,atthediscretionofthecourt.”88 21.Pennsylvania(1860):Sec.87.“If any person shall unlawfully administertoanywoman,pregnantorquickwithchild,or sup-posedandbelievedtobepregnantorquickwithchild,anydrug,poison,orothersubstancewhatsoever,orshallunlawfullyuseanyinstrumentorothermeanswhatsoever, with the intent to procure the miscarriageofsuchwoman,andsuchwoman,oranychildwithwhich she may be quick, shall die in consequence of ei-ther of said unlawful acts, the person so offending shallbe guilty of felony, and shall be sentenced to pay a finenot exceeding five hundred dollars, and to undergo animprisonment, by separate or solitary confinement atlabor,notexceedingsevenyears.”

  Sec.88.“Ifanyperson,withintenttoprocurethemiscarriage of any woman, shall unlawfully administertoheranypoison,drugorsubstancewhatsoever,orshallunlawfullyuseanyinstrument,orothermeanswhatsoever, with the like intent, such person shall beguilty of felony, and being thereof convicted, shall besentencedtopayafinenotexceedingfivehundreddol-

  ——————

  881860Conn.Pub.Actsp.65(emphasisadded).

  Citeas: 597U.S. (2022) 91

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  lars, and undergo an imprisonment, by separate or sol-itaryconfinementatlabor,not exceeding threeyears.”89 22.RhodeIsland(1861):Sec. 1. “Every person who shall be convicted of wil-fully administering to any pregnant woman, or to anywoman supposed by such person to be pregnant, any-thing whatever, or shall employ any means whatever,withintenttherebytoprocurethemiscarriageofsuchwoman, unless the same is necessary to preserve herlife, shall be imprisoned not exceeding one year, orfined notexceeding onethousanddollars.”90 23.Nevada(1861):Sec.42.“[E]verypersonwhoshalladminister,orcause to be administered or taken, any medicinal sub-stance,orshalluse,orcausetobeused,anyinstru-ments whatever, with the intention to procure the mis-carriageofanywomanthenbeingwithchild,andshallbe thereof duly convicted, shall be punished by impris-onmentintheTerritorialprison,foraterm not lessthantwoyears,normorethan five years; provided,that no physician shall be affected by the last clause ofthis section, who, in the discharge of his professionalduties,deemsitnecessarytoproducethemiscarriageofanywomaninordertosaveherlife.”91 24.WestVirginia(1863):West Virginia’s Constitution adopted the laws of VirginiawhenitbecameitsownState:

  “Such parts of the common law and of the laws of theStateofVirginiaasareinforcewithintheboundaries

  ——————

  891861Pa.Lawspp.404–405(emphasisadded).

  90R.I.Acts&Resolvesp.133(emphasisadded).

  911861Nev.Lawsp.63(emphasisaddedanddeleted).

  92 DOBBSv.JACKSONWOMEN’SHEALTHORGANIZATION

  AppendixAtoopinionoftheCourt

  of the State of West Virginia, when this Constitutiongoes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto,shallbeandcontinuethelawofthisStateuntilalteredorrepealedbytheLegislature.”92

  TheVirginialawinforcein1863stated:

  Sec. 8. “Any free person who shall administer to, orcausetobetaken,byawoman,anydrugorotherthing,or use any means, with intent to destroy her unbornchild, or to produce abortion or miscarriage, and shallthereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion ormiscarriage, shall be confined in the penitentiary notless than one, nor more than five years. No person, byreason of any act mentioned in this section, shall bepunishable where such act is done in good faith, withtheintentionofsavingthelifeofsuchwomanorchild.”93 25.Oregon(1864):Sec.509.“Ifanypersonshalladministertoanywomanpregnantwithchild,anymedicine,drugorsub-stance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrumentor other means, with intent thereby to destroy suchchild, unless the same shall be necessary to preservethe life of such mother, such person shall, in case thedeathofsuchchildormotherbetherebyproduced,bedeemedguiltyofmanslaughter.”94 26.Nebraska(1866):Sec. 42.“Every person who shall willfully and mali-ciouslyadministerorcausetobeadministeredtoortaken by any person, any poison or other noxious or de-structivesubstanceorliquid,withtheintentionto

  ——————

  92W.Va.Const.,Art.XI,§8(1862).

  93 Va. Code, Tit. 54, ch. 191, §8 (1849) (emphasis added); see also W.Va.Code,ch.144,§8(1870)(similar).

  94Ore.Gen.Laws,Crim.Code,ch.43,§509(1865).

028-6199 7390

四川省成都市金牛区蜀西路46号盛大国际7栋1单元401

2019 四川诚谨和律师事务所 蜀ICP备12009100号

技术支持:律品科技